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Abstract
This work analyzes the interaction between R&D organizations (RDO's) and industry. In
doing so, it looks at the experiences of institutions from several countries in the
establishment of programs to link both sectors; analyzes the possibilities of a particular
RDO (the Mexican Institute of Water Technology - IMTA) to interact with industry; and
designs a specific strategy to link this institution with the Mexican productive sector.
The analysis of previous experiences was crucial for the development of this work. It not
only highlighted the problems of the interaction but most importantly, it also provided
valuable insights for the establishment of efficient interaction programs. Conversations
with experts deeply involved in the interaction and with vast experience in this field were
particularly useful. This is the case of those interviewed at MIT, frequently regarded as a
top-leading institution in the establishment of this sort of programs and at several RDO's
in Mexico, as their experience is directly related to the Mexican context.
The analysis of the particular case of IMTA shows that at this point its possibilities to
interact with industry are rather limited. The reasons for this assertion are that: the
present structural conditions of the country make any interaction effort extremely
difficult; the demand for IMTA's products and services is currently small; the judicial
status of the Institute and its dependence on other public institutions constrains its
capacity to interact with industry; the administrative capacity of IMTA to handle the
interaction is limited; and finally, its experience with interaction is almost nil.
As a result, the benefits that IMTA may expect to derive from the interaction will be
rather small, at least in the short term. However, the costs for implementing such policy
will also tend to be small. Therefore, if IMTA decides to implement programs to interact
with industry it should do so as a middle or long-term commitment. Viewed under this
perspective it seems that the interaction has a good potential to benefit IMTA through:
the generation of additional income for the Institute and its researchers; the reduction of
its dependence on other institutions in the sector; and an improvement in its
responsiveness to the real needs of society.
The strategy that IMTA needs to follow to interact with industry requires a reinforcement
of its administrative capacity and the institutionalization of its interaction efforts. This
means that IMTA will need to adopt organizational structures, policies and
communication channels explicitly designed to facilitate the interaction and most
importantly, to recruit personnel capable of handling efficiently such interaction.
Thesis Advisor: Professor Richard de Neufville
Chairman, Technology and Policy Program
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Chapter One: Introduction
The establishment of collaboration agreements between R&D organizations (e.g.
universities and public research institutes) and industry is a practice that has long existed.
In fact, the implementation of programs designed to link the two types of organizations
can be traced back several decades, especially in the case of some industrialized
countries. However, it was until the early 1980's when governments, industry and
academia really directed their attention and committed themselves to study the
phenomena of R&D organizations - industry interaction. Today, fifteen years later, far
from being abandoned, this trend continues to be followed.
The revolution of production systems currently under way throughout the world is
making these systems increasingly dependent on science and technology. As a result,
firms are recognizing that more than ever, the knowledge embedded in their products and
processes is a crucial element of their competitive advantage. The relevance of this
vision is highlighted by the fact that there is a pronounced tendency in many industries
towards the development of more competitive business environments. Moreover, the
new world economic order is accentuating this effect even more because it is setting the
appropriate conditions for intense rivalry and competition; especially, through the
establishment of more open market economies, the emergence of regional processes of
economic integration and the adoption of policies favoring the liberalization of trade and
the globalization of commerce by many countries.
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Although it has been observed that in developed countries (DC's), between 40 to 60% of
their total R&D expenditure is undertaken directly by industryl , it is now becoming
evident that industry alone does not have enough capacity to deal with the velocity,
complexity and high costs associated with the development of technological innovations
indispensable to compete successfully in today's world. More and more firms are moving
away from the tradition of basing their business strategies on the mere exploitation of
comparative advantages (e.g. low factor costs), to adopt strategies which combine these
advantages with those derived from multiple factors of competitive advantage. For
example, many firms are now placing an unprecedented emphasis in aspects such as
organizational learning (under a national, regional, continental or even a global scale) as
one of the main dimensions of their competitive advantage. In this way, they are building
their competitiveness over a much more sustainable basis. It is conditions such as these
that drive industry to seek a closer collaboration with R&D organizations (RDO's). If
firms are to remain competitive, they will need to look systematically for new knowledge
and to be able to incorporate that knowledge into their products, manufacturing processes,
organizational structures, etc.
For RDO's and, in particular, for those publicly funded, the establishment of ties with
industry is becoming extremely important because many of them are being affected by
considerable reductions of public expenditures in science & technology (S&T). In the
U.S., for example, the reduction of public funding for military-related R&D has
substantially decreased in recent years. In addition, increasing political and social
pressures are being applied on RDO's to force them to perform research more responsive
to civilian needs. As governments recognize the importance of technological
innovation as a means to enhance the productivity and competitiveness of their national
industries, they are trying to motivate RDO's to find more useful applications for their
1 Waissbluth, M., (1990), "Regulaci6n Acad6emica de la Vinculaci6n", in Vinculaci6n Universidad - Sector
Productivo, BID-SECAB-CINDA, Santiago, Chile, pp. 150-163
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research efforts. On the side of societal pressures, the public is demanding from them a
more effective contribution to the satisfaction of societal needs as well as a deeper
involvement in the search for solutions to most of the problems currently faced by their
countries (e.g. environment pollution).
In some less developed countries (LDC's) like for example those in Latin America, the
situation is even more critical as, in general, industry is traditionally responsible for no
more than 5 to 15% of the total R&D expenditure undertaken in these countries. 2 In
addition, the situation is aggravated by the fact that during the last decade, many of them
were immersed (and some still are) in deep economic crisis that demanded even more
stringent cuts of public funding for RDO's (particularly for universities). At the same
time, societal pressures are strong and difficult to deal with because they are normally
linked to the satisfaction of basic needs (health, education, provision of basic services
such as energy and water supply, etc.).
Therefore, in this sense, the challenge for the entire scientific and technological
community of LDC's (RDO's, industry, government, etc.) is much greater than for its
counterpart in DC's. The modernization and revitalization of their domestic industries
has to be achieved under adverse economic conditions, with scarce resources, and within
a limited time frame as a result of pressures related to the possible entry of new
competitors (particularly fostered by the adoption of policies in favor of the liberalization
of trade, the reduction of the participation of the state in the productive sector, etc.).
As a result, it is no longer acceptable to nurture the interaction between RDO's and
industry solely under the tradition of education and training of qualified human
resources. The interaction between the two types of organizations needs to be much more
2 L6pez, R., & Solleiro, J.L., (1992), Promoci6n de la Innovaci6n a Travds de la Cooperaci6n entre Centros de
I&D y el Sector Productivo", Internal Document, CIT-UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico, pp. 101-118
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profound and to involve a wider spectrum of activities if it is to really contribute to
economic development.
The purpose of this work is to study the interaction between RDO's and industry; to
analyze the experiences of several organizations in developed and developing countries
regarding the management of interactions of this sort; and to apply the insights gained
throughout the process to develop a strategy to improve the ties between a particular
public research institute (the Mexican Institute of Water Technology) and the Mexican
industry.
In order to do so, extensive interviews were performed at several organizations inside and
outside Mexico that have been remarkably successful in the implementation of
cooperation programs with industry. Particularly relevant for the development of this
work were those performed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), in the
U.S. and those at the Institute of Electrical Research (IIE) and the Technological
Innovation Center (CIT), in Mexico. In the case of MIT, the insights gained from the
interviews were particularly enlightening because they came from professionals working
at one of the world's pioneering institutions in the establishment of programs of this sort
and having vast knowledge and experience in issues related to the interaction process. In
the case of the two institutions in Mexico, their experiences were especially valuable
because they came from institutions that have succeeded in the establishment of
interaction programs within the specific Mexican context. In addition, several interviews
were performed at the Mexican Institute of Water Technology (IMTA) to get acquainted
with its objectives, organizational structure, policies, procedures, personnel and
organizational culture because the development of an adequate strategy for the interaction
of the institute with industry necessarily requires first a good understanding of all these
aspects.
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Chapter Two presents an overview of the most important factors that need to be
considered to analyze the interaction between RDO's and industry. The Chapter includes
first, a discussion of the main motivations and barriers that usually drive or inhibit both
parties to seek collaboration with each other. Next, it describes some of the most
common mechanisms used for the interaction as well as some of the typical
organizational structures usually adopted to promote, guide, support and/or manage these
relations. Finally, the Chapter describes certain requirements that may be instrumental
for the successful implementation of linkage programs of the sort under study.
Chapter Three consists of a description of the process of RDO's - industry interaction for
the particular case of Mexico. It includes a description of the main industrial
development strategy followed by the country during the last decades as well as an
overview of the political, technical, economic and social environment currently
influencing the interaction process in the country. Similarly, the Chapter also presents an
overview of those procedural and motivational factors that have an important impact on
RDO's - industry interaction in Mexico. Finally, it concludes with the presentation of
some examples of programs of this sort that have been successfully implemented in the
country.
Chapter Four consists of a description of the institution for which the linkage strategy is
being developed in this work (the Mexican Institute of Water Technology - IMTA). This
description includes, among others, the objectives, organizational structure, activities,
programs, areas of research and regulations of the institute as well as it human, financial
and material resources.
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Chapter Five presents a policy analysis of IMTA's decision to seek a more active
collaboration with the productive sector. The chapter looks at the particular context and
circumstances that gave rise to the institute's desire to collaborate with industry as well as
to the characteristics and perceptions of the policy-makers that will need to formulate
such policy. In addition the chapter analyzes the particular concerns of the institute's
policy makers as a means to explain the content of the resulting policy. And finally, it
concludes with an assessment of the particular resources that will be needed to implement
the policy.
Chapter Six describes the linkage strategy that the institute may follow. This includes,
among others, the definition of objectives and goals for seeking the interaction; an
assessment of the internal and external conditions that might influence the establishment
of relationships with industry; an assessment of the resources and capabilities of IMTA;
the identification of potential areas of linkage; the selection of specific mechanisms for
the interaction; the design of policies and norms to regulate the relationships with
industry; and finally, the design of formal and informal organizational arrangements to
manage the linkage.
Finally, Chapter Seven presents some conclusions that can be drawn from this work and
includes a series of recommendations that professionals may follow when facing similar
challenges.
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Chapter Two: Technology Transfer through R&D
Organizations - Industry Interaction
II.1 Introduction
The transfer of technology from RDO's to the productive sector is a phenomenon that has
long existed. However, what has changed throughout the years is the nature of the
technology transferred. If one considers the term "technology" as encompassing
knowledge, expertise or know-how and inventions or discoveries, it is possible to affirm
that universities and other RDO's have traditionally focused in the transfer of knowledge
(mainly through education and publication of papers) and have paid less attention to the
transfer of expertise and inventions to the productive sector. This condition is only a
reflex of the greater involvement of RDO's in basic rather than in applied research.
However, as a result of current changes in the economic, political, technical and social
environment surrounding their activities many RDO's are now starting to be more
concerned with the transfer of technology in the form of know-how and inventions.
According to Mackenzie and Rhys, the level of technology transfer from RDO's to
industry will depend upon two factors: a) the extent to which RDO-generated
technology is relevant to industry's and government's needs and; b) the ease with which
technology can flow between RDO's and the external environment.3
Obviously then, the accomplishment of an effective technology transfer will require
substantial interaction between RDO's and industry. In order to do so, it is absolutely
essential to instrument appropriate links and communication channels to facilitate such
3 Mackenzie, I. & Rhys, R. J., (1985), "Universities and Industry - New Opportunities from
Collaboration with Universities and Polytechnics", The Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist
Publications Ltd., London, U.K.
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interaction. The relevance of this statement must be stressed because it has been
observed that the success of linkage program will largely depend on the ability of
individuals from both organizations to establish personal relationships as they seem to
be one of the most efficient channels for technology transfer (Rhys, 1985).
From the presentation made in the introductory Chapter of this work it seem that
important conditions are already set in place to foster a more active cooperation between
RDO's and industry. However, in reality this process is not so simple. The phenomenon
of interaction between the two sectors is very complex. Multiple factors can directly or
indirectly influence the process. Not only are there differences per se in the perceptions
of individuals from both parties towards the interaction but there are also many
institutional policies and practices that influence and shape their attitudes. Moreover,
many factors in the environment surrounding RDO's and industry may also affect the
process. As a result, it is common to observe for example, how differences in opinions
or administrative procedures can destroy an otherwise fruitful relation if not properly
handled. The main problem is that it is not easy to alter the cultural, social and economic
differences between the two sectors. Therefore, what is needed is to design appropriate
mechanisms, policies and organizational structures to reduce potential tensions and to
adequately manage the relationship.
I.2 Motivations and Barriers for the Interaction
The first step required to analyze the phenomenon of RDO's - Industry interaction is to
understand what are the main motivations that drive each side to seek collaboration with
the other.
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11.2.1 Motivations for Interaction
In an extensive study of the experiences of 39 universities and 56 companies in the US,
Peters & Fusfeld identified the principal factors motivating the interaction between
universities and industry. The results of their study, which was based on personal
interviews made to professionals working at these organizations is summarized in Table
IL2.1.1 (listed in decreasing order with respect to the frequency with which each factor
was cited among the persons interviewed).4
Even though most of the factors cited in Table 11.2.1.1 are self explanatory, it is worth
making an additional comment on some of them. Starting with the factors motivating
universities, it is important to point out the following: First, from the responses obtained
it was observed that the motivating factor most frequently cited was, not surprisingly, the
need of universities to diversify their funding sources. However, except from the last
motivation (which was the less frequently cited), the rest of them were more or less cited
with the same frequency. Second, the beliefs of many university researchers that
industry money requires less "red tape" than government money is an important
motivating factor. Indeed, it is frequent to observe how researchers try to spend as little
time as possible in administrative functions to dedicate instead this time to the research
itself. And third, only a small percentage of respondents cited special government
programs to fund cooperative research as motivating factors. This is a somewhat
surprising result as these funds are frequently adequate for the financial needs of research
projects; its low importance can probably be attributed to the unawareness of many
researchers and/or RDO's of the existence of these programs.
4 Peters, L. S., & Fusfeld, H. I., (1982), "Current U.S. University/Industry Research Connections", in
University Industry Research Relationships, National Science Foundation, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., U.S.
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Table 11.2.1.1 Factors Motivating University - Industry Interaction
UNIVERSITY
* Industry provides a new source of
money; this helps diversify the
university's funding base
* Industrially sponsored research
provides students exposure to real
research problems
* To provide better training for the
increasing number of graduates going
into industry
* Industrial money involves less red tape
than government money and reporting
requirements are not as time
consuming
* Industrially sponsored research
provides an opportunity to work in an
intellectually challenging research
program which may or may not be of
immediate importance to society
* To gain access to company's research
facilities and equipment
* To obtain government funds available
to support applied research efforts
involving certain kinds of university -
industry collaborations
INDUSTRY
* To obtain access to manpower
(students and professors)
* To obtain a window on science and
technology (technology scouting)
* To seek general support of technical
excellence
* To gain access to university's facilities
* To obtain prestige or enhance the
company's image
* To be good local citizens or enhance
the company's image
* To make use of an economic resource
* To solve a problem or get specific
information unavailable elsewhere
Source: Peters, L. S., & Fusfeld, H. I., (1982), op. cit.
With regard to industry it is necessary to point out that by far the most frequently cited
motivation was the access to manpower (75% of respondents), especially in terms of the
recruitment of graduate students. Technological scouting was the second most important
motivating factor (for approximately half of the respondents). It seems that this factor is
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particularly important for firms participating in industries in which the rate of
technological innovation is high and in which the life cycles of products are frequently
being shortened as a result of intense competition (e.g. microelectronics). Also, the
desire of firms to obtain prestige through collaboration with universities proved to be a
more important factor than one might initially assume. Not only do firms wish to
collaborate with the best expertise but they also want others to identify them as
collaborators of prestigious RDO's. Finally, with regard to the development of new
products, it is important to point out that the relative low frequency with which this
factor was cited reflects the fact that industry rarely supports university research as a
planned stage of product development.
Other authors have found it useful to classify these motivating factors according to
certain criteria (e.g. importance, nature, etc.). From all of them, the one presented by
Solleiro (1990)5 and L6pez et al. (1992)6 may be particularly appropriate for the purpose
of this work. According to them, the main factors motivating universities and industries
to collaborate with each other can be classified as structural, institutional and individual.
"The structural conditions related to university-industry collaboration are those
determinants deriving from economic, political and technological spheres which have a
wide influence over the whole range of activities in that country but that exert especial
impact on the institutions and individuals involved in the interaction, motivating or
preventing cooperation" (L6pez et. al., 1992). Typical examples include a decline in
government expenditure in science and technology matters (e.g. reduction of public
funding for R&D projects), trade and industrial policies, economic conditions, etc. The
second set of variables derive from the particular characteristics of the institutions and
organizations involved in the interaction process (e.g. organizational structures, internal
5 Solleiro, J. L., (1990), "Gesti6n de la Vinculaci6n Universidad-Sector Productivo"., in Vinculaci6n
Universidad-Sector Productivo, BID-SECAB-CINDA, Santiago, Chile, pp. 167-192
6 L6pez, R., et. al., (1992), "Motivations and Obstacles to University Industry Cooperation (UIC). A
Mexican Case", Internal Document, CIT-UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico
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policies, regulations, procedures, etc.). Finally, the individual factors motivating the
interaction refer to those aspects that influence particular participants in the process
individually. Examples of this sort might include, recognition from the academic
community, personal income, professional satisfaction, etc. Table 11.2.1.2 presents the
principal motivating factors classified according to these criteria.
I.2.2 Barriers for Interaction
In 1984, the Canadian Corporate-Higher Education Forum published the results from a
large research project intended to study the phenomena of RDO's - Industry interaction in
that country.7 Among their most important findings, this work identified the barriers for
the interaction most frequently encountered in Canada. Table 11.2.2.1 presents a
summary of their findings.
As seen in Table 11.2.2.1, three basic barriers can be distinguished: First, the nature of
the research (basic vs. applied) often creates conflicts between the two parties. On the
one hand, RDO's are usually interested in pursuing knowledge at its frontiers. As a result
the goals of their research projects tend to be not clearly defined and their research efforts
to be seen as rather long-term commitments because of the large uncertainties involved
(basic research). In contrast, industry considers that research should be much more
focused, with its results clearly impacting products or processes and involving short-term
commitments (applied research).
Second, industry's demand to maintain the confidentiality of results of the projects they
fund frequently represents a controversial issue because RDO's have the responsibility of
disseminating knowledge throughout society. The adoption of this position by industry
7 Cyr, R., et al., (1985), "Spending Smarter. Corporate-University Cooperation in Research and
Development", Corporate-Higher Education Forum, Les Editions Marquis Lte, Montreal, Canada
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Table 11.2.1.2 Classification of Factors Motivating the Collaboration Between
Universities and Industry
TYPE UNIVERSITIES INDUSTRY
Structural * Reduction of public funds to support * Need to increase their knowledge base to
R&D efforts maintain or enhance their competitiveness
* Skyrocketing capital costs necessary in highly dynamic business environments.
both for maintaining up-to-date * Difficulties in access to certain
facilities and for advancing state-of- technologies as a result of high acquisition
the-art research costs, tariffs, etc.
Institutional * Lack of laboratory equipment or * Lack of human I financial resources to
financial resources for research install in-house R&D labs
projects * Loss of technical competitiveness due to
* Increased flexibility from increasing technological complexity
diversification of funding sources * Recruitment of personnel
* Increased institutional prestige and * To enhance public image and reputation
reputation * It is easier and cheaper to contract
* Intellectual stimulus to enhance the university research than to obtain a license
quality of research to exploit certain technologies
* To respond to growing social pressure * Possibility of obtaining indirect financial
to contribute to the solution of real benefits from cooperation agreements (e.g.
problems from society tax exemptions)
* To Contribute to the diffusion of * Monitoring of technological frontiers
knowledge (technology scouting)
* To keep researchers updated and/or to * Opening of new technological windows
corroborate knowledge * Development and application of new
* To expose researchers to industrial technologies
environments * Improved training and motivation for future
* To enhance the quality of education employees
and training for students
Individual * Possibility of increasing their own * Possibility of researchers to remain abreast
knowledge by confronting of state-of-the-art knowledge and
challenging problems or by contacting technologies.
other researchers whom they might * Improved understanding of business in the
otherwise not encounter academic world
professionally
* Possibility of increasing personal
income
* Collaboration with industry
contributes to keep researchers
updated and to increase their prestige
* Satisfaction derived from the
contribution of the researcher to
accomplish the social function of the
university
* Elimination of stereotype of
researchers as living in an "ivory
tower" and lacking experience in the
solution of industry needs
Source: Adapted partially from L6pez et. al., (1992), op. cit.
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Table 11.2.2.1 Barriers Inhibiting R&D Organizations - Industry Interaction
Source: Adapted from Cyr et. al., (1985), op. cit.
derives from the beliefs of many industrialists that it is not justifiable to fund RDO's
research if the fruits of that research can be freely appropriated by other parties
(particularly by competitors). After all, they are the ones devoting the resources and
assuming the financial risks involved in the effort. On the side of RDO's both the
institutions and its personnel constantly need to publish research results to enhance their
reputation. In the case of researchers, this issue is particularly relevant because it is a
well established practice in many RDO's and especially in the academic environment to
evaluate the quality of their research and/or productivity in terms of the number and
quality of the articles they publish per year. This is extremely important because, at the
end, this evaluation is normally tied with awards, monetary incentives, promotions, etc.
The third structural barrier frequently encountered is related to controversies regarding
project management. It seems to be easy for both parties to fall into a continuous power
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TYPE BARRIER
Basic · Nature of research
* Publication and confidentiality of results
* Project management
Procedural * Inadequate marketing
* Contract complexity
* Interdisciplinary walls
* Geopolitics
Motivational * Lack of confidence / trust
* Not-invented-here syndrome
* Doubts regarding the usefulness of research
* Availability of true talent
struggle to control research projects. On the one hand, industry tries to exercise a tight
control over project costs and schedules as they have a tendency to believe that
researchers are informal when it comes to meeting deadlines. On the other, RDO's try to
insure that researchers are provided with enough latitude and flexibility to adjust
schedules and shift funds among different budget categories to respond promptly to
project requirements. For RDO's, this is an extremely important factor because it is very
difficult for them to prepare detailed programs due to the uncertainties inherent to
research.
In terms of the procedural barriers, the following four were identified: a) inadequate
marketing by universities; b) contract complexity; c) geopolitics; and d) interdisciplinary
walls. First, many firms claim that one of the main barriers for the interaction is the
inadequate promotion of RDO's capabilities and services (technical expertise, areas of
research, projects under execution, available facilities, etc.). Second, it is frequent to find
lack of expertise in the negotiation of contracts (especially in RDO's). Researchers tend
to feel uncomfortable dealing with long and complex contracts which they fail to
understand entirely. Therefore, the use of standard contracts might be advisable so that
negotiations will only need to deal with certain deviations derived from peculiarities of
the project or from the specific requirements of each party. Third, it has been observed
that projects which require the integration of multidisciplinary teams are difficult to
establish and manage by universities because of their lack of experience working with
this kind of teams. And finally, the psychological and physical distance between the two
sectors can also be important barriers. Psychological barriers are represented by
differences in culture and values that are frequently difficult to overcome while physical
distance is a barrier that is beginning to loose importance with the development of
modem communication systems (although many firms still clearly have more intense
patterns of collaboration with RDO's located close to them).
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Finally, at the motivational level, the following four barriers have been identified in the
literature: a) lack of confidence/trust; b) not-invented-here syndrome; c) existence of
doubts regarding the usefulness of the interaction; and d) availability of talent. The lack
of confidence and/or trust is a phenomenon that might exist in either party or in both. On
the part of industry there seems to be sometimes a perception that RDO's only look at
industry as "gold mines" and that they have a tendency to divert the funds provided by
industry to other areas out of the immediate scope of the project for which these funds
were provided. On the side of RDO's, many researchers see the goals of industry as
merely mercantile and believe that the establishment of close relations between the two
sectors will only lead to a loss of the independence and integrity of RDO's.
The not-invented-here syndrome is a phenomenon that can also negatively influence the
relationship through both parties. Many researchers (both in industry and in RDO's)
sometimes adopt negative attitudes towards ideas, results, general knowledge or even
technologies originated or developed in other organizations, institutions or sectors.
Somehow they seem to believe that they are less virtuous, valid or important just because
they were not developed in-house. This attitudes represent a barrier that is difficult to
overcome because in many occasions neither the individual nor the organizations are
really aware of their existence or they simply fail to give it the necessary importance.
This rejection attitudes does not necessarily have to be taken as ill-intentioned because it
is perfectly logical that researchers feel more comfortable working with the procedures,
methodologies or technologies with which they are more familiar (and which most likely,
will correspond precisely to those developed inside their own organizations).
Many firms tend to express doubts regarding the usefulness of university expertise
because they simply cannot envision university researchers with similar or more
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experience than their own in the solution of specific industry problems. Also, the scarcity
of talent has sometimes been reported as problematic because many researchers use the
pretext of lack of time to excuse themselves from not accepting to participate in research
projects that are not intellectually nor financially interesting to them (Solleiro, 1990).
In order to provide some coherence with the criteria used to classify the main motivations
for the interaction, L6pez, et al, (1992) followed a similar rationale to classify the main
barriers inhibiting the interaction. (see Table 11.2.2.2)
11.3 Mechanisms for the interaction
The exchange of knowledge, resources and technology between RDO's and industry is a
broad phenomenon that can adopt diverse modalities ranging from formal to relatively
informal (L6pez, et al., 1992). The mechanisms used for the transfer simply represent
working relationships through which the two sectors interact with each other and which
ultimately are dependent on the particular communication networks set in place by each
organization to manage the interaction (L6pez et. al., 1992). Table 1.3.1 shows some of
the mechanisms for the interaction identified from the literature related to this subject.
11.4 Organizational Structures to Promote/Manage RDO's - Industry Interaction
As mentioned in the preceding section, the mechanisms for RDO's - Industry interaction
can range from formal to relatively informal. The organizational structures established to
promote, guide, facilitate or manage these mechanisms should be designed considering
these characteristic to improve their chances for success. They should be consistent with
existing communication channels or otherwise these need to be adapted or created.
There is a wide variety of organizational arrangements that can be set in place to manage
the interaction. However, the following are the ones most frequently encountered:
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Table II.2.2.2
TYPE
Structural
Institutional
Individual
Classification of Barriers Inhibiting the Collaboration Between R&D
Organizations and Industry
BARRIER
* lack of financial resources and entrepreneurial mentality
(disposition to assume risks)
* cultural gap, lack of communication, incompatibilities,
mutual distrust of capacity of human resources and of
institutional responsiveness to objectives
* instability of public universities 8
* Excess of RDO's bureaucracy
* Disagreements concerning research costs, confidentiality and
industrial property rights
* technological gap between RDO's and firms; lack of
participation by firms in the early stages of project definition
* insufficient recognition for applied research
* Not-Invented-Here Syndrome
* Belief that academic researchers live in an "ivory-tower"
* Belief that cooperative research makes RDO's dependent on
industry, deviating its objectives and mission and/or
generating internal conflicts of interest
Source: Adapted from L6pez, et al., (1992), op. cit.
8 This is an issue that seems to be particularly relevant, at least in the case of several LDC's. The
political and social instability of public universities seem to have a negative influence in the perception
of many industrialists towards the interaction because it is frequently seen as increasing the risks
associated with the cooperative efforts.
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Table 11.3.1 Mechanisms for R&D Organizations - Industry Interaction
* Access to specialized facilities
* Awards for students, professors and researchers
* Conferences, colloquia, symposia and workshops
* Continuing education
* Cooperative education
* Corporate financial support for basic research
* Corporate financial support for colleges and universities
* Corporate financial support for students (scholarships,
fellowships)
* Corporate financial support for the establishment of special
courses and/or seminars
* Corporate recruiting of students
* Joint product or process development (cooperative research)
* Personnel exchange (internships and sabbaticals)
* Provision of specialized services (e.g. information searches)
* Technical assistance
* Technology transfer
* Training programs
* Volunteer programs, trusteeships and directorships
Source: Adapted partially from Solleiro J.L., (1990), op. cit.
II.4.1 National Systems for the Exploitation of Technology Developed at RDO's
Several governments have made attempts to promote the exploitation of technologies
developed at universities and other public research institutes through the establishment of
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special agencies, organizations or other public bodies to facilitate the licensing of their
inventions and commercialization of their technology.
The French Agence Nationale de Valorisation de la Recherche (ANVAR) was created in
1968 by the French National Scientific Research Council to provide support to inventors
and to facilitate the transfer of scientific and technological knowledge from RDO's to
industry (Mackenzie & Rhys, 1985). Some of the most important tasks of this agency
include the valuation of technologies and the performance of marketing studies to
determine the feasibility of successful commercialization of specific technologies. In the
cases in which these studies show promising results the agency finances up to 50% of the
incurred costs (which are paid back only if such projects are indeed successfully
commercialized). In the event that patents are obtained, ANVAR maintains the property
rights and licenses the technology in exchange for a royalty payment. In addition
ANVAR provides funds for the construction of laboratories in other countries as well as
for the establishment of cooperative research centers with industry. Finally, ANVAR is
the French Agency representing France in project EUREKA, the European Community
program to stimulate technological innovation in Europe.9
The British National Research Development Corporation (NRDC) of the UK (now
British Technology Group - BTG) was founded back in 1948 to exploit inventions
derived from government funded research.10 The tasks of the agency are to examine the
output of research centers to look for ideas that are patentable, to protect the interests of
the center and to try to obtain some revenue from the use and exploitation of the patent.
Therefore, BTG actually works as an intermediary that had, until 1983 (after this date this
9 Centro para la Innovaci6n Tecnol6gica, (October, 1992), "Rhone Alpes: La Regi6n de Todas las
Industrias", in Integraci6n Tecnol6gica, CIT, Unidad de Difusi6n UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico,
pp. 29-30
10 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, (1984), "Industry and University - New
Forms of Co-operation and Communication", OECD Publications, Paris, France
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requirement was eliminated), first right for the ownership and exploitation of all the
inventions derived from government sponsored research (Mackenzie & Rhys, 1985).
In Japan, the federal government created the Japan Research Development Corporation
(JRDC) to promote the execution of development projects by contract and technology
licensing activities. In the first case, JRDC organizes proposals for development projects
and selects the company to carry out the work. If the project succeeds the company is
allowed to commercialize the new technology under a new contract in which the firm
agrees to reimburse JRDC the total project costs and to pay them a royalty fee. In the
second case, the main role of JRDC is to take appropriate measures to facilitate the
licensing of patents held by publicly funded RDO's (OECD, 1984).
In general organizations like the ones previously described have been relatively
successful. I However, some researchers in this theme believe that they are highly risk
averse (Solleiro, 1990; Mackenzie & Rhys, 1985), that they involve long and tedious
bureaucratic procedures (Solleiro, 1990), that they have discouraged the search and
establishment of alternative commercialization channels by universities (Mackenzie &
Rhys, 1985) and that some of their policies (e.g. denial to grant exclusive licenses by
BTG) have discouraged the involvement of industry (Mackenzie & Rhys, 1985).
11.4.2 Industrial Liaison Programs
The establishment of industrial liaison programs (ILP's) is primarily intended to provide
the appropriate communication channels to facilitate the interaction between RDO's and
industry. However, it is important to point out that these formal communication
channels are not so relevant per se but as means to develop more informal relationships
11 For example, in the case of the UK in the period comprehended between 1952 and 1985, from 20,000
inventions, 7000 were commercialized with the help of BTG (then NRDC), which obtained revenues
from over 1000 of them (Mackenzie, I., (1985), op. cit.)
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vital for technology transfer and successful innovation. Although the services offered
through these programs have considerably expanded since the first versions of them
were established, broadly speaking they are mainly concerned with: a) directing
industrialists seeking help to the appropriate RDO's expertise; and b) with the promotion
of RDO's activities (primarily to attract industrial support for R&D).
Although there are numerous examples of liaison programs that could be cited, it is
important to mention that these types of programs usually vary widely in their objectives,
legal constitution, administrative structures, operational procedures and services
provided. In the UK, there is for example the case of the industrial liaison program
founded by the Heriot-Watt University (UNILINK), to provide a bridge between the
University and the Edinburgh industry (Mackenzie & Rhys, 1985). In Germany,
"UNIKONTAKT" is a liaison program operated jointly by Bochum and Dortmund
Universities primarily intended to direct industrialists from the Ruhr region to appropriate
universities' expertise (OECD, 1984). In Holland, ILP's (termed "Transfer Points") share
similar purposes but are organized under a regional basis. This is the case for example, of
the Transfer Point (TP) established by the Technical University at Twente (OECD, 1984).
The experience of the TP's is especially interesting because, as distinct from many other
industrial liaison programs, they are explicitly designed to promote linkages with small
and medium-size firms rather than with large corporations.
However, the most successful ILP's have been established in the US rather than in
Europe. This is the case of those established at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) and at the University of Stanford (Peters & Fusfeld, 1982). In fact, these programs
have not only succeeded in the accomplishment of their liaison objectives but they are
also financially sane.12 In both cases companies get enrolled in the program through the
12 Just in one year (1991), the revenues obtained by MITs Industrial Liaison Program exceeded $8
million, of which, approximately $3 million were granted to MITs operational budget. Source: Araoz,
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payment of a membership fee. 13 In return, the ILP's offer them a series of customized
services to maintain them informed of the latest developments in science and technology.
For example, Table 111.4.2.1 shows some of the services offered by MIT's Industrial
Liaison Program to its members.14
Table 11.4.2.1 Services Provided by MITs Industrial Liaison Program
The Stanford's Industrial Affiliates Program (IAP) differs from MIT's Industrial Liaison
Program in that there is a separate program for each department (Mackenzie & Rhys,
1985). Although Stanford's IAP is much more focused than MIT's Industrial Liaison
Program, they both share the similar broad communication goals. However, the program
at Stanford places more emphasis in the promotion of consulting activities by faculty as
well on the establishment of continuing education programs than that of MIT (Mackenzie
& Rhys).
A., (1993), "How MIT Interacts with Industry: Some Teachings for Latin America", Unpublished
Paper, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.
13 In contrast, most ILP established in Europe obtain their financial resources through the appropriation
of a percentage of any contract channeled through them.
14 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, (1993), "The MIT Industrial Liaison Program: A Guide to
Members", Internal Document, MIT-Industrial Liaison Program, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.
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* Meetings with faculty and staff
* Visits of faculty and staff to member companies
* Symposia, seminars, conferences, workshops, etc.
* Publications of current research, patent activity at MIT, activities on
campus, recent company spin-offs, new faculty appointments,
information of out coming students (resume books), etc.
* Linkage to MIT resources (researchers and fields of research)
* Offering of special courses in specific areas of interest to its
members
II.4.3 Technology Licensing Offices
Technology licensing offices (TLO's) are specialized units integrated into many RDO's to
facilitate the transfer of technology from RDO's to industry through the licensing of
patents and other forms of intellectual property. In general, the responsibilities of TLO's
can be summarized as: a) the review of patent disclosures; b) the pursue of patent
applications for promising technology developments; and c) the negotiation of patent and
copyright licenses.
Again, two of the best examples of TLO's that have been successful are found at MIT and
Stanford (together with the University of Wisconsin). Each day MITs Technology
Licensing Office receives one or two inventions, files about three patents applications per
week and ends up licensing over 90 per year (Araoz, 1991). Only in 1988, the 92
licensing agreements signed by the office generated more than $6.2 million in royalty
payments for the institute. 15 In the case of Stanford, its TLO licensed in the same year
only 75 patents, but obtained an income of approximately $9.2 million in royalty
payments (Preston, 1988).
According to Dr. Preston, director of MITs Technology Licensing Office, this office has
mainly four goals: a) to bring about the efficient transfer of technology as a way of
making technology available to the public; b) to manage conflicts of interest that are
inherent in faculty-industry interactions; c) to make money for the institute and its
researchers; and d) to generate good will both internally with MIT staff and externally
with the licensees. To accomplish these and similar goals it is essential for offices of this
sort to formulate clear licensing policies and to define a transfer philosophy (patent
ownership, licensing, royalty payments, etc.). However, it is recommended to allow
some flexibility to provide enough latitude to negotiate with industry (Preston, 1988).
15 Preston, J. T., "The Role of the University Licensing Office in Transferring Intellectual Property",
Internal Document, MIT-Technology Licensing Office, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.
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Finally, it is important to mention that besides the functions previously described, many
TLO's have an active participation in the promotion of start-up companies (spin-offs)
based on technologies developed at RDO's. For example, in the case of MIT, only in four
years (1984-1988), its TLO got involved in the creation of more than 40 spin-offs
(Preston, 1988). The principal role of TLO's in this case is to help locate private sector
funds to support and develop the new companies. However, it is important to note that
MIT's Technology Licensing Office philosophy of sharing the risk with the licensees
starting the new ventures, greatly enhances their chances for success (as the TLO allows
for example, the deferral of cash fees, the waiver of fee payments or the exchange of fee
payment for equity without an initial licensing fee).
I1.4.4 Firms Founded by RDO's to Commercialize their Technology
The establishment of these organizations is a result of the initiative of several RDO's that
have recognized that institutional barriers such as the excessive bureaucratic procedures
of many RDO's can be surmounted through the adoption of organizational structures
more familiar to industry. Vuman Ltd., a firm created by the University of Manchester in
the UK, represents an example of this sort (OECD, 1984). The company was founded by
the University to "select likely inventions and to assist university scientists in developing
their ideas to a point where they might be commercialized either by themselves or
perhaps in conjunction with another firm" (OECD, 1984). In addition, Vuman LTD.
provides financial and managerial support to academics desiring to commercialize ideas.
Although firms like Vuman have in general been successful, authors like Solleiro (1990)
point out that they have a tendency to be to selective in the technologies they support and
that they normally assume a reactive rather than a proactive attitude towards the
identification of promising technologies.
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HI.4.5 Technology Brokers
Technology brokers are independent firms specialized in the management and
commercialization of technology. Although this type of organizations play a role similar
to firms like those described in the previous section (such as Vuman Ltd.) their
characteristic of being independent from both industry and RDO's frequently causes a
lack of trust and confidence from both parties to contract their services. This condition,
coupled with the uncertainties and high risks involved in the commercialization of
sophisticated technologies which frequently require their services has made it difficult for
them to succeed in their efforts.16 As an example, Davis (1985) reports that Patents Inc.,
a U.S. technology broker lost over $1.1 million in 1984.
11.4.6 Technological Innovation Centers
Although many technological innovation centers play similar roles and offer similar
services as some of the other organizational structures described in this work, its principal
distinction is their dedication to the study of the process of technological innovation. The
reason for this attitude is that it is believed that a better comprehension of this process can
significantly contribute to stimulate innovation, to ease technology transfer and, in
general, to strengthen the ties between RDO's and industry. For these reasons, much of
the efforts of these organizations are centered around the education of professionals in
areas related with technology management and technological innovation. In particular,
many of the courses offered at these centers are intended to prepare future entrepreneurs.
In general technological innovation centers are considered to be adequate means to
achieve a good RDO's - Industry interaction. In particular, the experiences of several of
these centers established in the US is quite encouraging (see Peters and Fusfeld, 1982).
16 Davis, B., (October, 1985), "Technology Brokers Meet Limited Success", in High Technology,
Technology Pub. Co., Boston, Massachusetts, U.S., pp. 66
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For this reason, other DC's like Canada and Ireland as well as LDC's like Mexico have
been following their steps in recent years.
11.4.7 R&D Consortia and Cooperative Research Centers
It is becoming increasingly popular for groups of companies to get together and sponsor
research through the establishment of a consortium. This trend has been particularly
observed in high tech industries in which the costs of performing R&D alone are
becoming prohibitive (e.g. biotechnology). It is important to note that because of their
nature, R&D consortia are usually established to sponsor basic rather than applied
research. As a result of this characteristic disputes over intellectual property are almost
never an issue. A traditional example of an R&D consortia is the Council for Chemical
Research, established in the US in 1982 and having a partnership of more than 37 firms
and 128 universities (Peters & Fusfeld, 1982). More recently, universities like MIT,
represent examples of institutions that are aggressively pursuing the establishment of
these types of cooperation agreements.17
A more durable and longer-term commitment for cooperative research efforts between
RDO's and industry is the establishment of Cooperative Research Centers (CRC's). As
in the case of consortia, CRC's are mainly focused on basic research. This characteristic
allows the centers to obtain support from firms immersed in a wide variety of industries
because their research fields frequently cut across the interests of several industries. In
the US the initiative for the establishment of these centers came from the National
Science Foundation (NSF), which during the 1970's and 1980's: a) provided seed money
to fund the centers; b) promoted an increasing involvement and acceptance of financial
compromises by industry in the centers; and c) supported the centers during their first
years of operation (hopefully no more than five) before industry assumed full financial
17 MIT constantly hosts approximately 70 consortia in a wide variety of research fields.
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responsibility for their operation (Peters & Fusfeld, 1982). As a consequence, some of
the most successful CRC's have been established in the US (e.g. MIT Polymer Center).
However. there are also interesting experiences in other developed countries like Canada
(OECD, 1984), with the establishment of the Institute Nationale de la Recherche
Scientifique (INRS), sponsored jointly by the Canadian Government and Bell Northern
Research (a wing of Bell and Northern Telecom).
The success of CRC's can be attributed to several factors. First, the mere concept of the
center provides more focus (as they address specific needs and concerns) to the research
and this might facilitate cooperation with industry; second, their typical organizational
structure (more familiar to firms) is viewed, in general, as providing a more convenient
interface with industry; and third, their condition of being "generic research centers",
allows them to diversify their funding sources (government, RDO's, multiple industries,
etc.).
1.4.8 Industry Incubators
Industry incubators (II's) are organizations established to promote the creation of
technology-based firms. These incubators are usually founded by universities and other
RDO's and are constructed in land developments near these organizations (although quite
frequently the initiatives for their creation come from federal or state governments). In
order to stimulate the creation of new firms, these incubators offer facilities and services
to groups of firms which share them to reduce their initial operation costs. Among the
facilities and services frequently provided by II's the following are the most important:
physical space, laboratory services, office equipment, managerial and legal support,
accounting services, means to get financial support, access to information systems
(libraries, databases, computer networks, etc.) and human resources (students and
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researchers). Although the time allowed for firms to remain in the incubator varies, a
period of 3 to 5 years seems to be quite common (Solleiro, 1990).
The creation of II's is mainly intended to protect newly established firms in the stage in
which they are most vulnerable. This is so because it is in this stage when firms have to
make large disbursements to pay for installation costs and also because the uncertainties
associated with the actual demand for their products and their lack of experience makes
them especially susceptible to drawbacks. It is believed that through the reduction of
initial operating costs, the facilitation in access to funding sources and the offering of
specialized services to these firms, II's can significantly increase the possibilities of these
firms to successfully commercialize their products or processes.
An interesting aspect of industry incubators is the criteria that is beginning to be popular
to select the firms allowed to be incubated. For example, in some less industrialized
countries like Mexico, these firms should be: a) environmentally sane and moderate
consumers of energy and other natural resources such as water; b) producers of high
value-added products; c) very promising in terms of profitability; d) capable of
developing international markets for their products; e) employers of specialized labor;
and f) capable of creating new jobs.18
II's have demonstrated to be very effective to promote the creation of new technology-
based firms, to facilitate the transfer of technology from RDO's to industry and to
strengthen the ties between the two sectors (especially in industrialized countries like the
US). However, in LDC's, the creation and operation of II's has not been as successful.
18 Talavera, A., (1991), "Nuevos Instrumentos de Desarrollo Tecnol6gico en Mexico: Las Incubadoras
de Empresas de Base Tecnol6gica (Contexto y Diagn6stico)", Memorias del IV Seminario
Latinoamericano de Gesti6n Tecnol6gica, Caracas, Venezuela, pp. 337-346
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However, countries like Mexico and Venezuela still have plans for the establishment of
several incubators.
11.4.9 Technology Parks
Although some authors (like Escorsa, 1991) believe that in order to analyze the
experiences of technology parks it is necessary to differentiate them from "science parks"
(UK), "research parks", "technopolis" and "technopols" (France), for the purpose of this
work they will be treated indistinctively.19 In general, technology parks can be defined as
land developments that are normally constructed near major universities or other
prestigious research institutions to: a) attract firms or corporations which are traditionally
involved in R&D activities; and b) to provide the ground for the creation of new high
tech ventures.
There are two main reasons frequently cited to justify the creation of these parks: First,
that the clustering of universities, research institutions and technology-based firms in a
specific region promotes the creation of formal and informal communication channels
(largely through personal contacts) that facilitates the exchange of ideas, knowledge and
technologies, therefore creating a synergistic effect in the R&D activities of the region.
And second, that the construction of technology parks contributes to the growth of
existing firms and promotes the creation of new ones (many of which are founded by
students, researchers or professors from the universities of the region), therefore fostering
the creation of jobs and ultimately, the economic well-being of the region (Escorsa,
1991).
19 Escorsa, P., (1991), "Parques Tecnol6gicos: Una Evaluaci6n de las Experiencias Europea y
Norteamericana", Memorias del IV Seminario de Gesti6n Tecnol6gica, Caracas, Venezuela,
pp. 267-274
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The first experience in the establishment of technology parks dates back to the 1930's
when an initiative of the University of Stanford (in California, US) gave origin to the
foundation, in 1953, of the Stanford Industrial Park (Escorsa, 1991). The creation of
this park, eventually made possible the phenomenon of Silicon Valley, a region around
Palo Alto, California which has the largest concentration of high tech firms in the world
and that employed, back in 1991, around 35,000 persons.2 0 A similar phenomenon
occurred in the state of Massachusetts (US), with the establishment of many high tech
companies along 30 km of an industrial corridor in Route 128. Many of these firms
participated in industries such as microelectronics and aerospace and were largely
attracted to the region because of its closeness to MIT, one of the world's top leading
institutions in research and education in these areas. Other examples of technology parks
in the US are Austin, Texas (Dos Santos & Parejo, 1991), Research Triangle Park, in
North Carolina (OECD, 1985), and Rensselaer Technology Park, in New York (Dos
Santos & Parejo, 1991).
In Europe, countries like Germany, the UK, France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and
Finland have been actively promoting the establishment of technology parks. Examples
that can be cited in the UK (Mackenzie & Rhys, 1985) include the Ricarton Research
Park, linked to Heriot-Watt University with 6 companies established and employing 250
graduates; Trinity Science Park, located next to Cambridge University with more than 45
companies; Manchester Science Park with 11 firmns established and 21 more that were in
incubating process in 1991. In France (Dos Santos & Parejo, 1991), classic examples are
Sophia Antipolis in the Cote-d'Azur region, next to the city of Nice. In 1985 the park had
490 established firms, 171 schools, centers and foundations, employed 9600 people and
generated 6.3 billions of French francs per year. Another example in France is ZIRST
20 Dos Santos, S. & Parejo, M., (1991), "Parques Tecnol6gicos: Un Analfse Comparativa de
Experiencias Consolidadas de Pafses Desenvolvidos e Iniciativas de Pafses Latinoamericanos", in
Memorias del IV Seminario de Gesti6n Tecnol6gica, Caracas, Venezuela, pp. 255-265
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(Zone for the Innovation and Scientific and Technological Realization), established in the
Grenoble region and housing 170 firms (of which more than 100 were created as a direct
consequence of the foundation of the park) and employing 4000 people. In Latin
America, countries like Brazil have had some interesting experiences like, for example,
the Campinas Technology Park (61 firms principally in the telecommunications, chemical
and information systems industries) and the Sao Carlos Technology Park, next to Sao
Paulo University (with 52 participating firms). Other countries like Mexico, Venezuela
and Colombia are now starting to follow the steps of some of these countries and are
currently planning the construction of technology parks of this sort.
11.4.10 Centers of Excellence
Many RDO's have realized the convenience of setting centers specialized in the study of
issues relevant to the industrial sector. In these "centers of excellence", researchers spend
their time analyzing aspects of total quality management, organizational behavior,
productivity and other areas that may be of interest to industry. As a result, it is not
surprising to observe how many of them have succeeded because they are normally
capable of finding sponsors within the state or federal government or from various
industries. For example, in the US, the Ohio's Thomas Edison Program and the Arizona's
State's Excellence Engineering Program were both founded primarily with the support of
states' governments (Peters & Fusfeld, 1982).
II.5 Requirements for Successful Interaction
Although it must be noted that there is no such thing as a formula for success, the
experiences drawn from literally hundreds of attempts to link RDO's with industry more
effectively can be used to identify various factors that can be critical for success.
However, it is important to have in mind that each particular case is different. At the end,
the effectiveness of each alternative will depend on the needs of the firms, on the
41
capabilities of RDO's to satisfy those needs and on the particular context in which the
interaction occurs.
Table 11.5.1 show some of the principal factors that have been identified from the
literature as instrumental for the success of many interaction programs (Mackenzie &
Rhys, 1985; Solleiro, 1990; SRI International, 198621 ). The factors have been arranged
according to the same criteria used to classify the principal motivations and barriers for
RDO's - industry interaction to stress which organizations or sectors need to be concerned
in each case.
As can be seen from Table II.5.1, there are four factors that cut across the different levels
of analysis. This is so, because they represent integration factors that bring together
individuals and organizations with the much broader context represented by the structural
conditions. First, the physical proximity of certain industries and government bodies will
exert certain influence on the areas of research performed at nearby RDO's (e.g.
biotechnology in the Boston area). Second, the existence of proactive leaders is crucial
to develop relations and to promote an environment supportive of those relations in
RDO's, government and industry. These leaders frequently have to convince individuals
and organizations of the benefits of the interaction, work as translators between the two
sectors and help to settle conflicts and disputes that may arise during the relationship.
Third, the existence of good internal and external communications is absolutely essential
to identify opportunities, anticipate constraints and improve coordination, particularly
across different sectors. And finally, although it is desirable to assume attitudes and set
policies, procedures and regulations to manage the interaction, it is always convenient to
21 SRI International, (1986), "The Higher Education-Economic Development Connection: Emerging
Roles for Public Colleges and Universities in a Changing Economy" , American Association of States
and Colleges (Editors), Washington, D.C., U.S.
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Table 1.5.1 Success Factors for RDO's - Industry Collaboration
STRUCTURAL
* Creation of fiscal
incentives to
promote
collaboration (e.g.
tax exemptions,
investment tax
credits. etc.)
* Establishment of
programs to fund
collaborative efforts
between RDO's and
industry
INSTITUTIONAL OR PROCEDURAL
* Clarity of objectives and parameters of
evaluation of researchers, projects and
programs
* Existence of adequate institutional capacity in
terms of expertise, facilities, equipment and
financial resources for the interaction
* Establishment of adequate organizational
arrangements to promote and manage the
interaction
* Categorization of collaboration agreements and
definition of policies to regulate each
agreement; for example, for contract research,
consulting, etc.
* Formulation of clear policies regarding:
- income generation, administration of funds and
distribution of earnings
- intellectual property protection
- evaluation schemes
- monetary incentives and rewards
- promotional systems
* Good program administration
* Availability of adequate legal support
INDIVIDUAL OR
MOTIVATIONAL
* Good will, trust and
confidence in the
other party
* Previous experience
in collaborative
efforts between the
two sectors
* Promotion of
dialogue between
individuals with
compatible
technical or
managerial
backgrounds to ease
communication
* Strategic location of RDO's with respect to industry, government agencies, etc.
* Strong, proactive leadership to overcome barriers, develop relations and promote the interaction
* Good communications (formal and informal networks to allow for the flow of information and the
establishment of relations between RDO's and the public and private sectors)
0
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Flexibility provided at all levels to allow for the match of specific industry needs with RDO's
capabilities under different conditions, circumstances and contexts.
- -
allow for a certain degree of flexibility: a) to accommodate for particular needs,
circumstances or requirements that may not have been anticipated, and b) to leave
enough room to modify or adjust the programs as experience in running them is gained.
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Chapter Three: R&D Organizations - Industry
Interaction in Mexico
III.1 Introduction
The preceding Chapter presented a general overview of the phenomena of RDO's -
Industry interaction including the experiences of many organizations around the world.
However, as the ultimate purpose of this work is to study the chances of a particular RDO
to successfully interact with industry, it is now necessary to start narrowing down the
analysis. For this reason, this Chapter presents an overview of those structural,
procedural and institutional factors that influence the establishment and maintenance of
relations between RDO's and industry for the particular case of Mexico. To complement
this presentation, the Chapter ends with a brief description of some interaction programs
that have been successfully implemented in the country.
m1.2 Structural Conditions
As mentioned in the previous Chapter, the structural conditions related to RDO's -
Industry interaction are those determinants deriving from economic, political and
technological spheres which have a wide influence over institutions and individuals
involved in the process, motivating or preventing the interaction (L6pez et al., 1992).
However, it is important to mention that the opposite is not always true as the individuals
and/or institutions directly involved in the interaction are rarely able to influence these
structural conditions. Therefore, in this sense, these conditions can be thought off as
constituting the context surrounding the interaction. Following, is a description of the
most important factors that need to be considered to analyze the phenomena of interaction
in the case of Mexico.
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II2.1 International Context
As a developing country, Mexico continues to be dependent upon and vulnerable to a
broad set of international and economic conditions. The new world economic order is
forcing Mexico to confront important challenges but at the same time is offering
important opportunities for development.
Undoubtedly, from all the changes occurring in the economic order, the worldwide
revolution of production systems is one of the most relevant for less developed countries
like Mexico because of its broad technical, economic, political and social implications.
The scientific and technological advances of developed countries in areas such as
microelectronics, biotechnology and materials science are completely revolutionizing
manufacturing systems, production processes and the ultimate characteristics of their
goods and services. These advances, coupled with innovations in organizational systems
and management structures are allowing DC's to achieve exceptionally high levels of
productivity and to produce goods and services of superior quality. As a result, these
countries have been able to increase the efficiency of their production systems and
therefore, to optimize the use of resources traditionally abundant in developing countries
(e.g. raw materials, labor, energy, etc.). In this way, they have been able to capitalize
their investment in R&D projects and to translate it into an element of competitive
advantage over LDC's.22
A direct consequence of this situation is that LDC's like Mexico are now facing a decline
in the structural demand of those production factors that traditionally gave them a
comparative advantage over industrialized countries. The development of new materials
22 This capitalization of DC's R&D efforts has not only been achieved through reductions in costs
resulting from improvements in their production processes but also through an increase in the value-
added of their products and services derived from aspects such as quality improvements or the
inclusion of innovative features.
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has reduced the demand for more traditional ones usually produced in developing
countries (e.g. composites for aluminum); the development of more efficient or
alternative production processes has reduced the demand for energy sources abundant in
LDC's (e.g. coal and oil); and the modernization and automation of production lines has
increased the need for highly trained personnel subsequently reducing the need for large
numbers of unskilled, cheap labor, frequently found at developing countries.
On the other hand, the decline in demand for raw materials and traditional sources of
energy (which constitute the main exports of many developing countries) has had a
profound impact on international prices forcing them to fall while the prices of goods and
services sold by developed countries (and imported by developing countries) continues to
rise as a result of their increasing value-added.
In summary, as stated by de Marfa y Campos2 3, "the technological revolution is allowing
developed countries to consolidate in areas in which they have been traditionally strong,
to regain those they were losing to less developed countries - like textiles - and to develop
new products to give them the lead in high-tech fields."
In addition to these advantages, the present trends towards the internationalization of
services and the globalization of commerce are reinforcing the position of developed
countries. For example, the development of modern communication systems and the
reduction of transaction costs is allowing some transnational corporations to coordinate
and integrate better the activities of their plants, facilities and offices around the world.
Similarly, recent attempts for regional integration are substantially modifying the
structure of many industries and the terms of competition. For example, the
harmonization of policies and standards in the European Union is allowing firms
23 De Marfa y Campos, M., (1988), "M6xico Frente a los Retos de la Nueva Revoluci6n Tecnol6gica", in
Comercio Exterior, SECOFI, Mexico City, Mexico, vol. 38, issue 12, pp. 1084-1094
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established in Europe to exploit economies of scale by supplying many countries from
single-large scale facilities. As a result, some firms from developed countries are now
better suited to exploit their comparative and competitive advantages on a worldwide
basis.
Finally, there is another worldwide trend significantly affecting technological
development. That is, the current attitude of many firms from developing countries
towards the appropriation of technology. Due to the increasing contribution of
technology to the value-added of modem products and processes, to their short life-
cycles, and to the uprising costs of R&D in certain fields (e.g. biotechnology), many
firms are opting to limit the access of third parties (especially competitors) to these
technologies.
This strategy presents three negative aspects (de Marfa y Campos, 1988). First, there is a
tendency to grant fewer licenses and export directly (or when this is not possible to
directly invest). This strategy is now being facilitated by the adoption of liberalization
policies and the implementation of more attractive foreign direct investment policies in
many developing countries. Second, modern technologies are being sold at higher prices
than before and their sale is subject to more restrictions. And third, transnational
corporations have been exercising significant pressure on developing countries to modify
their intellectual property legislation. In this case, particularly relevant has been the
pressure exercised by the US through international fora such as the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The aim has been to try to standardize
the terms and protection offered by intellectual property policies according to developed
country standards (especially to those of the US).
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11I.2.2 Economic Conditions
The 1980's represented for Mexico and many other Latin American countries a decade
full of difficulties and challenges during which the world saw one country after another
fall into deep economic recessions. For Mexico, the 1982 drop of oil prices (which
accounted for 78% of total Mexican exports at the time) marked the beginning of a crisis
of foreign exchange that drained the federal reserves and triggered inflation to a rate of
58.9% per year.24 The public deficit rose to 16.9% of GDP and forced the government
to rely increasingly on international loans to service a foreign debt that in those days
totaled $82 billion (Grindle, 1993). In the second half of the decade the situation was
aggravated when two powerful earthquakes hit Mexico City in September of 1985,
provoking losses of more than $5 billion in damages; by a further drop of oil prices in
1986; and by a crash of the Mexican stock market in 1987. By 1988, the foreign debt
well exceeded $100 billion and inflation was near 130% per year (Grindle, 1993).
In 1988 the government took steps to renegotiate the foreign debt with its international
creditors and signed a stabilization agreement with the IMF. The agreement with the
IMF required the implementation of a structural adjustment program that mandated,
among other measures a strict control of public expenditure to reduce inflation and to
correct desequilibria of the balance of payments. This reduction of government
expenditure has had profound effects in the Mexican economy. The contraction of
public investment in the productive sector and in social programs such as education and
public works, provoked a slowdown in economic growth because in Mexico the
government has been traditionally a main motor of the Mexican economy. As explained
further on, this situation has had profound effects in the productive sector and in
government efforts to promote technological development.
24 Grindle, M.. S., (1993), "Lecture on the Politics of Development Policies in the Third World",
Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.
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IIL2.3 Industrial Structure and Commercial Policies
During most of this century, Mexico as many other developing countries (especially those
in Latin America), primarily followed a strategy of import substitution to promote the
industrial and economic development of the country.25 However, during the 1980's this
strategy had to be substantially modified as a result of the economic crisis. With the fall
of oil prices, it became clear that the country could no longer continue to rely on external
borrowing to finance industrialization as the lack of foreign currency made it increasingly
difficult to service the debt. At the same time, growing protectionism from
industrialized countries and rising international interest rates complicated the situation
even more. 26
By the mid- 1980's, the government realized that significant policy changes were required
if the country were to come out of the crisis. First, as explained earlier, stabilization
measures were adopted as a result of the signature of an agreement with the IMF. This
meant the imposition of severe fiscal restraints and monetary controls that provoked a
reduction of public and private investment in the productive sector. Second, the state
undertook an unprecedented privatization effort among developing countries to permit
the development of a more open market economy. This meant that the participation of
the government in the productive sector were to be more selective (e.g. in certain priority
sectors such as energy) and even in those cases, limited only to certain activities. And
third, the opening of domestic markets by removing restrictions on foreign investment in
priority sectors such as telecommunications and banking. In addition, the government
has followed since 1985, a policy of liberalization of trade that started with the entry of
25 Import substitution industiialization can be very broadly characterized as a shift from import to the
local manufacture of consumer goods (e.g. food processing and clothing), some technology-intensive
goods like consumer durables (e.g. automobiles), intermediate goods (e.g. cement and steel), and
certain capital goods (e.g. heavy machinery).
26 Gereffi, G., (1991), "International Economics and Domestic Policies", Chapter 9 in Economy and
Society: State of the Art, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, California, U.S., pp. 231-258
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Mexico into GATT and that eventually resulted in the signature of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada. Mexico and the US.
From an industry perspective, there are many implications that can be drawn from these
policies. However, in general they all can be summarized into just two words: greater
competition. The Mexican industry, accustomed of being protected from foreign
competition by import restrictions such as tariffs and quotas, grew up without needing to
reach the levels of innovation, quality and productivity required today to compete
successfully with foreign firms and on the same ground. This condition is complicated
by the fact that most of these firms will need to compete under severe limitations as, in
Mexico, between 90 to 95% of the Mexican firms are small or medium-sized.
1112.4 Scientific and Technological Development
In Mexico it has been traditionally taken for granted that the prime responsibility in the
promotion and development of science and technology corresponds to the state. In fact,
according to the Mexican "Law to Coordinate and Promote Scientific and Technological
Development" (LCPDST), it is the responsibility of the state to coordinate the activities
of the National System of Science and Technology (SINCYT). The SINCYT, is
integrated by all the federal agencies and public bodies that participate in the creation of
scientific and technological knowledge and in its integration into the productive sector;
by all the norms and policies that regulate their functions and activities; by all the state's
actions intended to stimulate, promote and finance the generation, diffusion and
application of science and technology; and by those organizations, groups and
institutions from the scientific and technological community or from the private or social
sectors that are admitted to the system according to the provisions dictated by the
LCPDST.
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In 1990, the Mexican government formulated the National Program for Science and
Technological Modernization (PNCYMT) to set the guidelines for the participation of the
federal government in the promotion of the scientific and technological development of
the country for the period 1990-1994. This document presents an assessment of the
principal problems currently faced by the SINCYT. (see Table III.2.4.1)
From all the problems shown in Table III.2.4.1, undoubtedly the first one deserves special
attention, because in Mexico, only around 0.36 % of the country's GDP (1993) is devoted
to science and technology while in many DC's, this percentage normally fluctuates
between 2 to 3% of GDP (see Figure 111I.2.4.1). It is obvious that for a rapidly developing
country like Mexico, this number is much smaller than needed but the economic situation
of the country has severely limited the availability of resources. In fact, as a result of the
economic crisis of the 1980's and just in the period from 1981 to 1993, there was a
reduction, in real terms, of more than 30% in the federal expenditure in science and
technology (FES&T). In 1981, the FES&T represented 0.46% of GDP while, in 1993,
this value fell to 0.36% of GDP. Table 111.2.4.2 show these values and Figures III.2.4.2
and 111I.2.4.3 illustrate them.
This reduction is particularly relevant because in Mexico, between 85 to 90% of the
country's total R&D expenditure is undertaken by the Mexican government (Waissbluth,
1990). This is a condition quite contrasting with what happens in developed countries in
which this participation normally fluctuates from 40 to 60% (Waissbluth, 1990). The
contraction of FES&T has been primary notorious in the following areas: a) direct
financial support for R&D programs performed at public research institutes, government
agencies and other public bodies; b) contracting of R&D projects with private firms or
other social organizations; c) the provision of incentives to promote scientific and
52
Table 111.2.4.1 Problems Faced by the National System of Science and
Technology (SINCYT) in Mexico 27
27 Secretara de Programacidn y Presupuesto - Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologfa, (1990),
"Programa Nacional de Ciencia y Modernizaci6n Tecnol6gica, 1990-1994", SPP - CONACYT,
Mexico City, Mexico
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* Lack of sufficient resources to support activities related with scientific research and
technological modernization, including the development of human resources
* Incorrect allocation of public funds to support R&D efforts and lack of adequate
systems to evaluate results.
* Lack of monetary incentives and low wages offered to researchers
* Lack of sufficient incentives to promote the acquisition of new technologies and the
commercialization of technology
* The S&T infrastructure of the country is in bad shape and in many cases is obsolete
* Lack of appropriate infrastructure to promote the linkage between RDO's and the
productive sector
* Insufficient efforts to decentralize R&D through the promotion of scientific and
technological activities throughout the country
* Inadequate access to consulting services and information systems by firms and other
institutions
* The country's scientific and technological community is reduced and there is lack of
interest from young generations to pursue careers associated with S&T
* Education deficiencies at the primary and high-school levels and lack of attention
given to the teaching of courses related with S&T
* Higher education frequently does not reach appropriate quality levels
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Figure 111.2.4.1 National Expenditure in Science and Technology as a Percentage of
the Gross Domestic Product of Selected Countries (1988) 28
28 National Council for Science and Technology, (1992), "Indicators - Scientific and Technological
Activities, Mexico, 1992", CONACYT, Mexico City, Mexico
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Cientifficas y Tecnol6gicas", CONACYT, Mexico City, Mexico
Actividades
55
YEAR FEDERAL EXPENDITURE GROSS DOMESTIC FES&T
IN SCIENCE & PRODUCT GDP
TECHNOLOGY (GDP) (%)
(FES&T)
Current Prices 1980 Prices Current Prices 1980 Prices
1980 836.3 836 194,775 194,775 0.43
1981 1144.8 1041 250,005 227,277 0.46
1982 714.7 612 170,574 146,014 0.42
1983 471.6 388 148,779 122,341 0.32
1984 646.3 509 175,667 138,233 0.37
1985 653.4 496 184,432 139,954 0.35
1986 554.5 336 129,535 95,711 0.35
1987 394.7 283 141,442 101,363 0.28
1988 466.8 322 173,512 119,680 0.27
1989 590.0 375 206,923 136,448 0.27
1990 725.0 458 244,508 154,586 0.30
1991 1049.6 638 287,737 174,916 0.36
1992 1142.6 677 329,076 194,985 0.35
1993 1244.4 718 348,706 201,378 0.36
1994 1280.8 719 368,513 204,014 0.35
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technological development; and in d) direct or indirect support and/or participation in the
education and training of human resources.
On the other hand, the large participation of the state in S&T matters emphasizes the
small involvement of Mexican industry in science and technology. In fact, there are
estimates that only 65 out of a total of 200,000 firms operating in Mexico, perform some
sort of in-house R&D activities in the country.31 This lack of tradition of the Mexican
industry to participate in R&D efforts is especially troublesome because in developed
countries, industry represents a major driver for technological development.
Even though, it seems that in Mexico many industrialists are not interested in getting
involved in R&D activities to develop their own technologies or to adapt technologies
acquired abroad; either they are risk averse, lack the financial resources or simply just fail
to recognize that technology should not be viewed as merely another production factor
but as a key element of their corporate strategy. Rather, they normally prefer to acquire
mature technologies from countries in which those technologies have previously been
tested. The problem is that frequently by the time these technologies are acquired, most
of their life cycle has expired therefore rendering them obsolete. Certainly this would not
constitute a problem if a protectionism policy would continue to prevail in the country as
firms could do relatively well with low levels of quality and productivity. But with the
adoption of liberalization policies, and the entry of foreign competitors employing top-
of-the-line technologies and exhibiting modem organizational systems to achieve high
levels of productivity and quality, firms operating under these conditions will find it not
only increasingly difficult to do financially well but simply to survive.
31 Solleiro, JL., (1990), "La Vinculaci6n de la Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico con el Sector
Productivo", Working Document, CIT-UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico
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Besides this lack of tradition to invest in R&D, the economic crisis of the country
contributed to worsen the situation even more. The economic recession meant a
generalized decline in demand (especially because the profitability of many firms
depends on their sales to the government), high interest rates, scarcity of capital and
credits and, in general, a reduction in productive investments. As a result the few firms
performing R&D were forced to cut their expenditures in these areas and to postpone
any modernization plans that they might have had.
II1.2.4.1 Financial Support for R&D and Fiscal Incentives
Even though the federal government has been forced to reduce its overall expenditure in
S&T, there are still some institutions and programs that continue to offer some sort of
financial support to sustain the scientific and technological efforts of the country. This is
the case of public entities such as the National Council of Science and Technology
(CONACYT), of the Secretariat of Public Education (SEP) and of some financial
creditors like Nacional Financiera (NAFINSA).
Among these, the support provided by CONACYT has been particularly important. As
CONACYT is one of the main channels through which federal resources flow to support
S&T, for many years the Council has been located at the core of the scientific and
technological development of the country.3 2 Although traditionally the involvement of
the Council in S&T matters has been rather extensive, there are certain areas in which its
participation has been particularly relevant.3 3 This is the case of its participation in the:
a) financial support for students performing graduate studies in Mexico and in other
32 For example, just in 1994, CONACYT administered more than $300 million dollars. Source: Consejo
Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologfa, (1993), "Indicadores de Actividades Cientficas y Tecnol6gicas",
CONACYT, Mexico City, Mexico, pp. 127
33 Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologfa, (1989), "CONACYT Informa, 1989", CONACYT, Mexico
City, Mexico
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countries (scholarships); b) financial support for scientific and technological development
projects; and c) the administration of funds for the National Researchers System (SNI).34
With respect to more specific programs designed to provide support to industries or to
promote the cooperation between RDO's and industry, there are three programs financed
by CONACYT that are particularly interesting.
First, there is a program called FORCCYTEC, which is a public fund administered by a
commercial bank and that is intended to finance the foundation of new R&D centers by
the private sector.3 5 The support provided by this program is only directed to the
equipment and possible adaptation of laboratories and cannot exceed 65% of the total
installation costs. The financial support offered by this program is really nothing more
than a loan in which 50, 75 or 100% of the total loan (as agreed by both parts) has to be
repaid to CONACYT in a maximum of 3 to 5 years. However, and despite these
provisions, it seems that the results of the program are still pretty modest. The reason for
this situation might be that the loans are granted based on commercial rates rather than
on some sort of preferential interest rates.
Second, CONACYT has established a program to provide financial support for the
development of industry incubators (PIEBT).3 6 In this case, the Council can either
participate directly as founder of the incubators or it can provide support to specific
projects developed at the incubator through any of its programs directed to promote
34 The National Researchers System (SNI) is an association formed by the most prestigious scientists and
researchers of the country and that was established in 1984 as a result of a government initiative. The
SNI operates as a federal fund, administered by CONACYT and that is used to make complementary
payments to the wages of its members. Admission into the SNI depends in a rigorous process of
selection and on the evaluation of special committees of prestigious researchers.
35 Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologfa, (1992), "FORCCYTEC, Fondo para el Fortalecimiento de
las Capacidades Cientificas y Tecnol6gicas", Informative Brochure, CONACYT, Mexico City, Mexico
36 Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologfa, (1992), "PIEBT, Programa de Incubadoras de Empresas de
Base Tecnol6gica", Informative Brochure, CONACYT, Mexico City, Mexico
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technological modernization. In any case, CONACYT's support cannot exceed 30% of
the total investment costs and cannot last more than 5 years. Because PIEBT is a rather
new program, it is difficult to evaluate at this point its success. However, it seems that
many difficulties are being encountered at this point to implement the program.3 7
Finally, there is another program that in this case is explicitly designed to promote the
linkage between RDO's and industry (PREAIN).38 Through this program, CONACYT
provides funding to promote the interaction from the two sectors in terms of: a) human
resources development; b) joint research and development; and c) commercialization of
technologies. In this case, CONACYT provides up to 50% of the total project costs and
does not require repayment, while the RDO and industry are supposed to provide the
other 50% (in this case, CONACYT normally pressures participating firms to provide at
least 35% of the costs leaving the RDO to pay the rest).3 9 In addition, there are several
important aspects of this program that need to be mentioned. First, the program mainly
provides support to projects related with the development of technologies (applied
research) rather than with projects involving scientific research (basic research). This is
so because there are other programs that provide wide support to this type of research
(e.g. in areas such as physics, mathematics, etc.). Second, the program is characterized
for being extremely flexible and therefore for allowing the accommodation of the
particular needs of each project and of the specific participants involved (e.g. in terms of
conditions for funding). According, to Ms. Maira, manager of the program, PREAIN has
been quite successful judging from the number of applications received per year (over
100 in 1992). However, the financial resources of the program are still quite limited.40
37 L6pez, R., (1994), Personal Interview, CIT-UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico
38 Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologfa, (1992), "PREAIN, Programa de Enlace Academia-
Industria", Informative Brochure, CONACYT, Mexico City, Mexico
39 Maira, G., (1994), Personal Interview, CONACYT, Mexico City, Mexico
40 In 1993 the program operated with a fund of merely $2.2 million dollars
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Finally, the government has established a group of fiscal incentives to promote the
involvement of RDO's, technology-based firms, national firms operating in the
productive sector and individuals in general, in the development of S&T.41 These
incentives take the form of tax exemptions, normally equivalent to 20% of the total
investment costs to cover aspects such as the acquisition of equipment and machinery, the
construction of auxiliary facilities or the contracting or direct involvement in the
performance of R&D projects.42 In the case in which the firms involved in these
activities are micro or small-sized, the tax exemption are normally equivalent to 30% of
the costs, while for individuals acquiring technology or contracting services related with
S&T such as consulting for the adaptation and assimilation of technology, the percentage
is equivalent to 15%. 4 3 Finally, in the case in which the technology is imported the
government allows federal tax deductions equivalent to 100% of import taxes.
IIL2.5 Intellectual Property Policies
In order to establish intellectual property policies congruent with the commercial and
industrial policies adopted in the country during the late 1980's, in June 27, 1991, the
Official Diary of the Federation published the Law for the Promotion and Protection of
Industrial Property (LFPPI).4 4 With the enactment of this new Law (which abrogated
the Law for the Control and Registration of Technology Transfer and the Use and
Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks) it became clear that a completely new mentality
was developing in the country regarding the appropriate protection of intellectual
property. As a result, Mexico now offers intellectual property protection (IPP) that can
41 Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologfa, (1987), "Marco de Aplicaci6n de Estimulos Fiscales y
Exenci6n de Impuestos Establecidos en Diversos Ordenamientos Legales Actualmente en Vigor",
CONACYT, Mexico City, Mexico
42 It is important to point out, however, that there are several restrictions and requirements to gain access
to these benefits, depending in issues such as the type of institutions involved (e.g. RDO's), the origin
of the equipment bought (national or foreign), etc.
43 Micro and small-size firms are those employing no more than 100 persons and with net sales inferior to
$325,000 dollars per year.
44 Villareal, R., (November, 1991), "La Nueva Ley Mexicana en Materia de Propiedad Intellectual", in
Comercio Exterior, SECOFI, Mexico City, Mexico, vol. 41, issue 11, pp. 1057-1065
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be considered quite similar to that offered by most developed countries (in particular by
the U.S.).4 5
As most of the laws enacted for the protection of intellectual property, the enactment of
the LFPPI is mainly intended to promote the scientific and technological development of
the country. 4 6 Instruments such as patents and copyrights are means to, on the one hand,
reward authors and inventors for their creativity and capacity to innovate and, on the
other, to provide incentives to promote a more active involvement of students,
professors, researchers, industrialists and society in general in the development of science
and technology.
Therefore, the new Law incorporates several provisions to function as incentives to
promote this participation. Provisions such as the extension of patent protection from 14
to 20 years (starting from the date the application is filed); the authorization for granting
patents for innovations in areas in which it was previously forbidden (e.g. for chemical
products, microorganisms, vegetable varieties, alloys, biotechnology and genetically
engineering products, etc.); the reduction in the number of situations in which
compulsory licensing will be enforced (e.g. under critical conditions such as scarcity of
certain products); or authorization for granting petty patents in the country, etc., all are
supposed to work as incentives to promote scientific and technological development.47
45 This is an interesting observation because in Mexico, intellectual property protection policies have
been traditionally inspired by those adopted in European countries and by international organizations
such as the Intellectual Property World Organization. However, it seems that in this case the pressure
exercised by the US (particularly through negotiations of the Uruguay Round of GATT) to adopt more
liberal intellectual property policies finally paid its fruits.
46 Serrano, F., (1992), "La Propiedad Industrial en Mexico (Nueva Ley para su Fomento y Proteccin)",
Editorial Porrda, S.A., Mexico City, Mexico
47 A "petty" patent is a type of patent granted to a product or process that has been adapted for a new
application or that offers certain advantages in its usefulness (e.g. as a result of modifications in its
structure ).
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Finally, an additional aspect of the new Law that is extremely important is that it
mandated the disappearance of the National Registrar for Technology Transfer (RNTP).
The Registrar, which was set in place at the beginning of the 1970's, was intended to set
the general conditions for the negotiation of licensing and technology transfer agreements
in the country. In this way, the Mexican government directly supervised and controlled
all these activities since any licensing or technology transfer agreement signed in the
country required approval from the government. However, with the increasingly
important insertion of Mexico in the international economy and with the increase the
level of competition in the business environment of the country, it became evident that
the RNTP had to be eliminated. If the state really was to set appropriate conditions for
the development of a competitive Mexican industry, it was necessary to provide firms
with enough freedom to negotiate their own licensing and technology transfer contracts.48
In this way, firms would be able to respond more efficiently, for example, to the threats
of competitors.
11L3 Institutional Factors
In Mexico, most of the factors affecting the interaction between RDO's and Industry are
similar to those presented in the preceding Chapter (see Tables 11.2.1.2 and .2.2.2).
Rather than repeating again all of these factors, this section presents a broader description
of those that are particular relevant to analyze the process of RDO's - Industry interaction
in the country.
1IL3.1 Bureaucratic Procedures and Regulations
As mentioned before, in Mexico, as in many other developing countries, the state plays a
fundamental role in the promotion and direct undertaking of activities related to the
48 Toledo, J., (November, 1991), "Justificaciones de Polftica Industrial y Comercial para Abrogar la Ley
de Transferencia de Tecnologfa", in Comercio Exterior, SECOFI, Mexico City, Mexico, vol. 41,
issue 11, pp. 1036-1040
63
scientific and technological development of the country. As a consequence of this active
participation, individuals, institutions and organizations involved in the process have to
perform their functions in a climate full of long and tedious bureaucratic procedures.
Moreover, the specific characteristics of the Mexican State seem to complicate things
even more than in similar countries in which the government has also a wide
participation in activities of this sort.
Most of the publicly funded RDO's, government agencies and public bodies involved
directly or indirectly in the SINCYT, seem to be characterized for being extremely
hierarchical organizations in which clientilistic and patronage relationships tend to
prevail. As a result, institutions such as publicly funded universities have adopted strict
internal regulations and procedures that can constitute very important barriers not only for
the establishment of cooperation programs with industry but also for the efficient
performance of most of their duties.
Undoubtedly, the most visible impact of bureaucratic procedures can be the
discouragement of individuals involved in the interaction. A scientist that needs to wait
months to get approval for a research project might finally decide not to go ahead with
this project simply because he lost interest in the research of because the right time for
performing the research has passed. Similarly, a failure to submit the results of a research
project on time because a repair piece for a lab equipment was supplied two or three
months after it was requested (because of formal acquisition procedures) may create a
lack of trust and confidence in the project sponsor for both the university and its
researchers.
Even though barriers such as these are clearly visible, this does not mean that it is easy to
overcome them. The modification of internal regulations and procedures normally means
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shifts in power and lines of authority. Therefore, it is possible to encounter significant
resistance to these changes, especially from bureaucracy itself. However, if attempts to
improve the interaction of RDO's with industry are to be successful it is absolutely
essential to try to set up more flexible procedures to really facilitate such interaction.
L3.2 Lack of Resources
Among the multiple needs for adequate material, financial and human resources to
participate in interaction programs with industry, there is one factor that seems to be
considerably affecting the capacity of several RDO's in Mexico to interact with industry.
It seems that especially at publicly-funded universities, there is a lack or not enough
qualified human resources to adequately take care of teaching and research activities
simultaneously.4 9 Researchers from many of these organizations complain that their
teaching activities leave them with little time to spend in their research programs. This is
both because of the small number of researchers and/or professors as well as because of
the lack of sufficient academic support for their efforts (e.g. teaching assistants).
II.4 Individual Factors
Again, in the case of the individual factors affecting the interaction, all of the factors
presented in Chapter two, seem to be important in the case of Mexico. However, the
structural and institutional factors affecting the interaction in the country seem to stress
even more the importance of motivations and barriers at the individual level. For
example, the traditional lack of cooperation between universities and industry makes the
collaboration more desirable for both sectors but at the same makes it more difficult to
overcome barriers such as the lack of confidence and trust. In the case of Mexico, the
following factors seem to be especially important.
49 According to Solleiro (personal interview, 1994), this is the case, for example, of many professors and
researchers working at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM).
65
IIL4.1 Personal Income
In contrast with most DC's, the salaries paid to scientists and researchers in Mexico are
extremely low, especially for those working for publicly-funded universities. As a result,
these institutions are normally troubled by high turnover rates or in the best of cases are
forced to allow their personnel to spend a considerable part of their working time
performing other activities (e.g. managing their own businesses or providing personal
services such as consulting). This situation is complicated by their small chance of
generating income from research related activities, even if these are sponsored by
industry. For example, there are many RDO's in Mexico which do not allow royalty
payments to be made to researchers as a result of the patenting of their own innovations.
IIL4.2 Recognition and Prestige
Unfortunately, in Mexico most professors and researchers do not enjoy the same level of
social recognition and prestige than some of their colleagues from other countries.
Undoubtedly a good explanation for this situation is their lack of visibility within society
because there is not enough promotion of their accomplishments. Certainly, a greater
interaction with industry is in this sense, a good opportunity to try to enhance their
prestige and to expand that prestige to sectors other than the academic.
l.5 Some Successful Experiences with the Interaction in Mexico
The purpose of this section is to present a brief description of the experiences of some
institutions with regard to the implementation of programs to link RDO's and the
Mexican industry. The analysis of experiences such as these together with the overview
presented in Chapter Two, provided insights that were extremely useful to understand the
problematic associated with the interaction as well as to visualize possible solutions to
these problems.
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In particular, the experiences of two institutions were very valuable. First, those related
with the Center for Technological Innovation (CIT), of the National Autonomous
University of Mexico (UNAM); and second, those from the Institute of Electrical
Research (IIE).
111.5.1 The Center for Technological Innovation (CIT)
The Center for Technological Innovation is a branch of UNAM, the largest public
university in Mexico. 50 CIT was founded in 1985 but its origins can be traced back to
1983 when the General Direction for Technological Development, its predecessor, was
created. The operational budget of C1T mostly comes from UNAM and almost all of its
personnel consists of academics.51
CIT was created with the explicit objective of linking the scientific and technological
potential of UNAM with the demands of the industrial sector. This is mainly done
through the provision of management services to facilitate technology transfer from the
university to industry. In addition, the center is actively engaged in research in areas such
as technological innovation, the study of science and technology policies and technology
management as well as in the education and training of professionals in these areas. In
this sense, its activities are typical of the technological innovation centers described in the
preceding Chapter. However, CITs engagement in activities such as technology
licensing, the negotiation of research contracts and the search for potential industrial
partners or sponsors, makes the center assume functions that are typical of other
organizational structures such as industrial liaison programs or technology licensing
50 Until 1990, the research capabilities of UNAM were concentrated in 22 research institutes, 13 research
centers, 2 general directions and 3 university programs employing more than 2500 researchers (without
taking into account the research performed at the individual schools - e.g. engineering, chemistry,
biology, etc.). In 1985, the university was engaged in more than 3370 research projects.
51 Quantitatively, more than 20% of UNAM's budget is used to support research (more than $400 million
dollars per year). Source: Solleiro, J.L., (1990), op. cit.
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offices. Table 111.5.1 presents the evolution of the services provided by CIT from 1985
to 1989.
Besides these activities, CIT has been actively involved in the establishment of more
complex organizational structures for the interaction. This is the case, of its involvement
in the creation of the Center for Electronic Technology and Information Systems (CETEI)
with the support of the National Chamber for the Electronic Industry and Electrical
Communications (CANICECE) and UNAM; of its participation in the foundation of the
"Morelos" Technology Park in conjunction with the Institute of Electrical Research, the
Association of Industrialists from Morelos, Nacional Financiera (NAFINSA) and the
Government of the state of Morelos; the creation of the SOMEX-UNAM fund which
provides direct financial support for technological research at UNAM; and its
participation in the negotiation of long term cooperative research agreements with large
corporate groups like the one signed between CONDUMEX (one of the leading
manufacturers of cable and electric equipment in Mexico) and UNAM.52
The experience of CIT provided valuable insights into the specific factors that can
determine the success or failure of interaction programs in similar institutions in Mexico.
Among the factors that seem to be critical for success, it is particularly interesting that
those projects in which personnel from CIT actively followed the interaction
(even after the contract was signed) were considerably more successful than those in
which the participation of the center ended with the signing of a contract.
Factors like these seem to emphasize that in countries like Mexico, a proactive
participation of technology managers throughout the entire interaction process is
52 This agreement involves different mechanisms for the interaction including contract research, joint
product development, consulting, workshops, seminars, sabbaticals, scholarships and awards.
According to Solleiro (1990), only 18 months after its creation the agreement already have given origin
to 40 collaboration contracts and channeled more than 300,000 U.S. dollars to UNAM.
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Table 111.5.1 Services Provided by UNAM's Center for Technological Innovation (CIT)
to Support Technological Innovation Projects.
Source: Solleiro J.L., (1990), op. cit.
absolutely crucial. Similarly, those projects for which there was a clear market demand
or those in which the principal researcher had high qualifications were also considerably
successful. In contrast, those projects in which the sponsors were firms with credit or
financial difficulties, those that were not properly supervised by CIT or those that
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TYPE OF SERVICE 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 TOTA
L
Search for specialized technical 4 8 17 17 20 66
information
Consulting in issues related with 8 8 8 30 36 90
intellectual property protection
Consulting in project direction 8 6 18 30 36 98
Search and linkage with firms 27 29 30 25 30 141
Formulation and negotiation of 22 34 39 36 43 171
contracts
Follow-up from projects already 27 43 60 83 99 312
contracted
Procurement of financial 5 1 9 11 2 28
resources
Technology consulting 2 3 3 5 6 19
Search and contracting of experts 2 2 1 5 - 10
Feasibility studies - 5 7 7 23 42
Total 105 139 192 249 295 980
involved considerable conflicts between researchers and entrepreneurs were the ones that
most frequently failed.
Finally, with respect to the success of the Center as such, it is important to mention that
several factors converged to make possible its accomplishments. First, its integration into
one of the most prestigious and better equipped universities of the country (in terms of
human, financial and material resources). Second, the existence of adequate regulations
and norms within the university to handle issues related with contract research,
technology licensing and distribution of income (e.g. distribution of royalty payments
among the central administration, schools and researchers). Third, its integration into a
large communication network including not only the research centers and schools of the
university but also multiple institutions within the public and private sectors. Fourth, the
vast knowledge and understanding of its personnel of the problematic associated with the
process of university-industry interaction as well as of the technological innovation
process. And finally, the proactive leadership of its members in the promotion of RDO's
- Industry interaction as well as in the overcoming of barriers encountered for such
interaction.
IIL5.2 The Institute of Electrical Research (HE)
The Institute of Electrical Research was founded in 1975 as a result of a presidential
decree that consolidated the institute as a decentralized public organization with
independent juridical status and its own patrimony. The IIE was created "to promote and
support technological innovation within the electric sector and among its suppliers and
users through applied research, technological development and specialized technical
services". 53
53 Instituto de Investigaciones El1ctricas, "Technological Developments and Services", Informative
Brochure, IIE, Cuernavaca, Morelos, Mexico
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The IIE currently employs more than 750 researchers in a wide variety of fields of
expertise and has over 25 laboratories and 20 experimental installations scattered across
the country. At this point its financial resources (approximately $43 million dollars in
1992)54 come from three sources (1/3 each): from the federal government in the form of
a direct subsidy; from the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) and from contracts and
agreements with other institutions in the industrial and other sectors.55
As a result of its mission, the managers and researchers of the institute have always
recognized that it is absolutely essential to link the development of the institute to the
needs of the industrial sector. Because of this perception, the lIE has always adopted a
proactive attitude towards the establishment of collaboration agreements with industry.
However, it is important to mention that the activities of the IIE have always been tightly
linked to the needs of the CFE. This is a somewhat understandable condition, because
the Commission is the "natural" customer of the institute. Besides, the type of projects
funded by the CFE and the federal government tend to be different from those funded by
industry. As usual, industry is more interested in funding applied, short term projects,
while CFE and the federal government are usually more interested in funding basic
research, with a more long-term horizon (e.g. for pollution control).
The recognition of the importance of linking the activities of the lIE with the needs of the
electric sector have driven the institute to implement several mechanisms to
commercialize their technology and to interact with the industrial sector. In general, the
institute has followed three trends to achieve these objectives. First, the promotion and
foundation of spin-offs to commercialize some of the mature technologies developed at
54 Instituto de Investigaciones Electricas, "Informe Anual 1992", IIE, Cuernavaca, Morelos, Mexico
55 These include, for example, resources to support specific projects coming from institutions such as
CONACYT or NAFINSA as well as from other national or international organizations.
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the institute.56 Second, an active participation in the project of the "Morelos Technology
Park" to promote the commercialization of technologies through firms established in this
park.5 7 And third, the direct sale of technologies and the negotiation of technology
transfer contracts.58 Besides, the institute is also actively engaged in the provision of
specialized technical services (e.g. consulting) as complementary means to
commercialize their technology and to capture additional income.
As can be seen from the information previously presented, the IIE has been very
successful in its interaction with industry and ultimately in the commercialization of its
technology. An overview of their experiences pointed out the following aspects as the
main reasons that can be attributed to its success. First, its juridical status and its own
patrimony give the institute considerable autonomy and liberty to pursue their objectives
through the means it deems more appropriate. Second, since the moment of its creation
the institute has grown reasonably close to the industrial sector. Third, research projects
are selected explicitly taking into account their potential for commercialization. Fourth,
there is active participation of industrialists, researchers, and managers in the evaluation
and selection of projects and lines of research. Fifth, the availability of important state-
of-the-art facilities as well as the excellence of its technical expertise has enhanced the
prestige of the institute in the sector. Sixth, the implementation of incentive and
promotional systems has considerably motivated the institute's personnel to achieve
increasing levels of productivity and creativity. Seventh, although the institute has
established general guidelines for the negotiation of contracts, it has adopted the policy of
56 The initial attempts of the lIE to promote the creation of these spin-offs dates to 10 years ago when 3
firms were established to commercialize technologies developed at the institute in the areas of control
and instrumentation, simulation and microelectronics. The firms were initially established with capital
from the IE, a private firm and the federal government. Although initially these firms were pretty
successful later on it was necessary to integrate them into a single company (SIMEX), which is
currently almost entirely privately owned.
57 Although the park has not yet started operations, there are already 10 member firms and the industry
incubator is under construction.
58 Particularly successful has been the sale of electronic equipment like remote terminals for the the
handling of information or simulators for training power plants' operators.
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negotiating each contract on an individual basis to provide enough flexibility to
accommodate specific requirements or provisions that may be important in the
negotiation of some of them. And finally, and perhaps most important, each five years
the institute develops a strategic plan in which it explicitly considers a strategy for the
commercialization and management of the institute's technology within that time frame.
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Chapter Four: The Mexican Institute of Water
Technology and its Role in the National
Hydraulic Sector of Mexico
IV.1 Introduction
The preceding chapters presented an overview of the most common problems associated
with the process of RDO's - Industry interaction in several countries and in particular, in
the specific case of Mexico. Starting with this chapter, the analysis of RDO's - Industry
interaction is narrowed even more to analyze the chances of a particular RDO (the
Mexican Institute of Water Technology - IMTA) to implement programs of this sort.
In order to do so, this chapter starts by presenting a broad description of the Mexican
water resources sector in which IMTA is immersed. From there on, the chapter focuses
on the description of the objectives, organizational structures, regulations, procedures and
research programs of the institute as well as on its general capabilities in terms of human,
material and financial resources. As will be seen in the next chapters, a deep
understanding of these aspects is absolutely essential to analyze and determine how
should the institute respond to the challenge of strengthening its ties with the productive
sector.
IV.2 The Water Resources Sector of Mexico
In Mexico, as elsewhere, water is considered a fundamental element for social and
economic development; water is not only a vital element for life and the protection of
health but is also a crucial input for the productive sector. As a result, all the water
resources of the country as well as all those problems associated with their exploitation,
use, management and protection are considered a national priority.
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Although there are estimates showing that the water resources of the country will be
enough to satisfy its future development needs 59, the possibility of using them will
depend largely on the capacity of the nation to preserve and exploit them efficiently.
However, this is a challenging task because the water resources sector is confronting
many problems and the resources available for their solution are scarce. On the one
hand, it is becoming evident that: a) demands for water supply from both urban and rural
sectors are increasing (for domestic, commercial and industrial use, irrigation, power
generation, recreation, fishery, etc.); b) the pollution of water resources like rivers,
streams, lakes, lagoons, reservoirs, acquifers, seas and oceans is getting worse (both in
terms of the quantity of pollutants as well as on their chemical complexity, toxicity, etc.);
c) there is an overexploitation of many water resources (especially acquifers, lakes and
lagoons); d) the demand for sewage systems and flood control infrastructure is
considerably growing; and e) demands for water of a better quality are also growing. On
the other hand, there are severe financial, material and human resources limitations within
the sector and in the country to face these problems. Although considerable resources are
being channeled to the sector they are just not enough to catch up with the growing
demand and to deal with the complexity of many of the problems that the sector is facing.
In Mexico, the construction and operation of infrastructure for the supply and
management of water resources is a tradition that dates back to several centuries. For this
reason, the country has accumulated considerable experience in the planning, design,
construction and equipment of large water resources projects. However, in areas such as
maintenance, pollution control, efficient use and preservation, the experience is small and
progress has been limited. As a result, a great emphasis is currently being placed in the
sector to find appropriate solutions to problems related to these fields.
59 Secretara de Recursos Hidrulicos, (1975), "Plan Nacional Hiddrulico, 1975", SRH, Mexico City,
Mexico
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Despite this accumulated experience, it was until the mid-1920's when pertinent
government commissions were created to coordinate the planning, construction and
administration of the hydraulic infrastructure of the country. However, the efforts of
these groups were really formalized until 1975, when the Secretariat of Water Resources
(SRH) formed the Commission for the Hydraulic Plan (CPH) to develop the first National
Hydraulic Plan (PHN - 1975). The plan presented the general strategy and guidelines for
the development of the National Hydraulic System (SHN) of the country. Later on, in
1976, the Secretariat of Agriculture and Water Resources (SARH) substituted the SRH
and in 1981 established the Commission for the National Hydraulic Plan (CPNH) to
substitute CPH and to develop a new National Hydraulic Plan (PHN - 1981) to guide the
development of the SHN during the 1980's.
In 1985, a decision was taken to institutionalize the special commission that elaborated
the 1981 plan (CPNH) and to transform it into an organization capable of going beyond
the mere performance of planning and diagnosis studies to the actual creation of operative
mechanisms to solve the problems of the sector.60 As a result, in 1986, the Mexican
Institute of Water Technology (IMTA) was created as a public entity dependent on
SARH's Under-secretariat of Hydraulic Infrastructure (SIH). 61 Finally, in 1989,
SARH's SIH was transformed into the National Water Commission (CNA) which, from
there on, became the sole water authority of the country. 62 As the CNA also depended
on SARH, it became part of this Secretariat while IMTA, in turn, became part of the
CNA.
60 Instituto Mexicano de Tecnologfa del Agua, (1992), "Informe 1992", IMTA, Jiutepec, Morelos,
Mexico
61 Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n, (August 7, 1986), "Decreto por el que se Reforman Varios Artfculos
del Diverso por el que se Cre6 el Organismo Tcnico Administrativo Denominado Comisi6n del Plan
Nacional Hidraulico", DOF, Mexico City, Mexico, pp. 29-31
62 Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n, (January 16, 1989), "Decreto por el que se Crea la Comisi6n Nacional
del Agua como Organo Administrativo Desconcentrado de la Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos
Hidrtulicos", DOF, Mexico City, Mexico, pp. 24
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But besides public institutions like IMTA, the CNA and SARH, the National Hydraulic
System also includes: a) other institutions performing water-related R&D as well as by
those providing education and training in areas related to water resources; b) other state
agencies with particular interests in the sector; and c) a vast number of direct and indirect
water users. In turn, this last group can be divided according to several socioeconomic
criteria but for the purpose of this work it will be divided in terms of the final use they
give to the water; that is: domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational,
power generation, etc. Figure IV.2. 1 presents a simplified scheme of the Mexican water
resources sector emphasizing the position of IMTA and other components of the sector
particularly relevant for the development of this work.
As can be seen in Figure IV.2.1 within the industrial sector there is a smaller group
formed by those firms generating income from their involvement in the
commercialization of products or processes directly related to water technology (e.g.
manufacturers of valves, electronic comptrollers, gauges, etc.).6 3 In contrast, the relation
of the rest of the sector with the SHN is either through the employment of water as a
direct input into their production processes and for other general purposes or through the
use of water bodies as recipients of industrial wastewaters (IMTA, Nov., 1992).
IV.3 The Mexican Institute of Water Technology and its Mission
As previously mentioned, IMTA was legally established back in 1986 to substitute the
CPNH. At that time, the primary objective to justify its creation was: "to develop the
technology and qualified human resources necessary to insure the rational and integral
use of water in the short and long terms." 64
63 Instituto Mexicano de Tecnologfa del Agua, (November, 1992), "IMTA:Perspectivas de
Comercializacin de Tecnologfas del Agua", Internal Document, IMTA, Jiutepec, Morelos, Mexico
64 Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n, (August 7, 1986), op. cit.
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NATIONAL HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
OTHER USERS:
DOMESTIC
COMMERCIAL
POWER GENERATION
NAVIGATION
* MANUFACTURERS OF WATER-RELATED TECHNOLOGIES
Figure IV.2. 1 The Mexican Water Resources Sector
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In practice, however, the fulfillment of this objective required IMTA to adopt a much
broader mission; that is: a) to strengthen and support basic and applied research for the
development and/or adaptation of technologies relevant to the Mexican water resources
sector; b) to facilitate the transfer of technology within the hydraulic sector (including
aspects concerning the creation, utilization, diffusion, assimilation, adaptation and
implantation of this technology); c) to link the R&D efforts and technology transfer
activities of the country to the priorities of the National Hydraulic System (SHN); d) to
prepare and train the human resources needed to solve the priority problems of the SHN;
e) to identify, prioritize, evaluate and distribute among the different sectors of the SHN
(e.g. agricultural, urban, industrial, etc.), the country's efforts to perform activities related
to R&D, technology transfer and human resources development; and f) to insure that
these activities have a positive impact in the economy and society.6 5
As a consequence of undertaking these missions, IMTA has consolidated itself as the
main motor for the technological development of the SHN. Therefore, a great part of its
activities is directed to set up appropriate conditions to insure that this development is
congruent with the possibilities and true needs of Mexico and its SHN. In this sense,
IMTA has recognized that an efficient transfer of technology is fundamental to meet
these conditions and to achieve a more efficient and rational use of water throughout the
country. For this reason, since its creation, IMTA has been actively participating in
issues related with technology transfer in the sector. In fact, its involvement in these
activities is probably its most important contribution to the development of the country's
SHN.
65 Talavera, A., (December, 1987), "Marco de Desarrollo Tecnol6gico del Sector Hidrtulico Nacional",
Internal Document, IMTA, Jiutepec, Morelos, Mexico
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IV.4 Organizational Structure
The organizational structure of IMTA has been designed to be congruent with several sub
sectors in which the SHN can be divided (see Figure IV.4.1). The maximum authority of
the institute is represented by its president (who, at the same time, has to be also the
general director of the CNA). 6 6 Although the president has many internal
responsibilities, most of its duties are associated with representing the institute at the
CNA and SARH. It is his responsibility to submit to SARH's Secretary the internal
regulations. procedures, working programs and budget proposals of the institute for his
approval. Similarly, it is his duty to suggest to SARH's Secretary the creation or
modification of juridical or administrative instruments that might be useful to improve
the efficiency with which the institute carries out its missions as well as to coordinate and
promote the utilization of results from the institute in the SHN.
In contrast, the executive provost has responsibilities more directly linked with the
internal work of the institute. Besides having to support the work of IMTA's president,
he is in charge of technically and administratively managing the institute. Also, he is the
official in charge of submitting to the president proposals for the designation of top and
middle level civil servants as well as of the direct naming of lower level technical and
administrative personnel.
The duties of president and executive provost are supported by an internal auditor as well
as by a coordinator of advisors. The internal auditor is mainly responsible for foreseeing
that fiscal regulations and procedures are met, while the coordination of advisors was
created to advice the institute's authorities in all issues relevant for the institute (lines of
research, administrative structures, procedures, etc.).
66 Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n, (June 7, 1988), "Reglamento Interior del Instituto Mexicano de
Tecnologia del Agua", DOF, Mexico City, Mexico, pp. 17-20
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The rest of the organization is structured around 7 coordinations and 1 administrative
office. Each coordination is integrated by 1 coordinator, several sub-coordinators,
researchers and administrative personnel. The coordinations are structured around a
mixture of functional areas (e.g. professional development), technical fields of expertise
(e.g. technical consulting group) and technical and socioeconomic sub sectors (e.g. urban
and industrial hydraulics technology). Each has the direct support of a technical secretary
and is further on subdivided into several sub-coordinations involved in more specific
functions (e.g. education and training) or fields of technical expertise (e.g. potabilization
and wastewater use). As for the administrative branch of the institute, the management
office is in charge of the general administration of IMTA's human, material and financial
resources as well as of the integration of budget proposals.
As can be seen from Figure IV.4.1, IMTA's organizational structure can be characterized
as mainly horizontal. However, IMTA as so many other public institutions in Mexico,
is really a very hierarchical organization in which the formal distribution of power and
authority is always stressed. As a result, internal regulations and procedures are strictly
followed and the main flow of information is made through formal communication
channels. This is a somewhat undesirable situation because it makes IMTA a very rigid
organization. For RDO's like IMTA in which technological innovation and technology
transfer activities need to form part of their core competencies, organizational flexibility
is of crucial importance. Flexible organization arrangements normally eliminate to a
great extent the need to undergo bureaucratic procedures characteristic of many
extremely hierarchical institutions. In addition, flexible organizations serve to avoid
many of the problems associated with the improper flow of information throughout the
organization and between the institute and external firms, agencies or other institutions
(e.g. misunderstandings, incorrect information flow, etc.). Therefore, the mere
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avoidance of these problems usually makes flexible RDO's better suited to perform their
work more efficiently.
Also, the emergence of informal communication networks is usually more difficult in
rigid organizations. This is also an important statement because it has been proven that
the productivity of the personnel performing activities related with innovation and
technology transfer are greatly enhanced through the promotion of informal relationships
within their own organization and between this organization and its surroundings.6 7 For
example, the mere existence of informal relationships inside the institute has the potential
to motivate the creativity of researchers as well as their problem-solving capacity if they
take advantage of informal consulting with other researchers at the institute. Also, the
existence of informal communication networks can significantly ease the flow of
information. As in this case information is transmitted more directly and in a highly
personal base, the chances for improper transfer are usually smaller. In addition, these
networks can significantly contribute to improve the responsiveness of the institute to
external needs as well as to the transfer of knowledge from the institute to the SHN
because again, the flow of information is more expeditious and information tends to be
more accurate. This is an issue that can be quite relevant, especially when response time
is an important factor.
IV.5 Activities, Programs and Fields of Research
All the activities and programs related with technological development performed at the
institute can be very broadly characterized as falling within the following categories: a)
research and development; b) technology transfer; c) consulting; d) human resources
development; and e) communication and diffusion of actions.68 However,
67 Allen, TJ., (October, 1970), "Communication Networks in R&D Labs.", in R&D Management, A.W.
Pearson (Editor), Alden & Mowbray Ltd., Oxford, U.K., vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 14-21
68 Talavera, A., (January, 1989), "Diagn6stico y Consideraciones sobre una Prospectiva Tecnol6gica del
Sector Hidrulico Nacional (Informe Final)", Internal Document, IMTA, Jiutepec, Morelos, Mexico
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organizationally these activities fall within the scope of the seven coordinations of the
institute.
As can be seen from Figure IV.4. 1, activities such as consulting, human resources
development and communication and diffusion of actions are each undertaken by one
coordination. However, those related with R&D and technology transfer are performed
by three coordinations, depending on their field of technical expertise and the
socioeconomic sector involved (e.g. urban and industrial hydraulics or irrigation and
drainage).
IV.5.1 Research and Development
The research and development activities performed at the institute are grouped at three
coordinations (urban and industrial hydraulics technology, irrigation and drainage
technology and hydraulic systems technology). As previously mentioned, each of these
coordinations is further subdivided into more specific fields of expertise. In this way,
specific R&D projects are undertaken by more specialized units. Table IV.5.1.1 shows
some of the principal research fields and technological developments that have been
performed at the institute.69
IV.5.2 Technology Transfer
In a sector such as water resources, technology transfer activities need to be a
fundamental component of any strategy for technological development. This is so,
because most of the times the final technology users are groups from quite different
natures and with very distinct needs and interests (such as peasants, industrialists, etc.).
For this reason, it is necessary to insure that the technologies developed in the sector are
69 Talavera, A., (November, 1988), "Estado Actual de los Principales Elementos del Proceso de
Desarrollo Tecnol6gico del Sector Hidrfaulico Nacional", Internal Document, IMTA, Jiutepec,
Morelos, Mexico
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adapted to these needs and that the transfer of technology really takes place (that is, that
those technologies are actually assimilated. implanted and utilized by their intended
users).
Table IV.5.1.1 Principal Areas of R&D at the Mexican Institute of Water Technology
Being aware of the relevance of technology transfer activities in the sector, most of the
efforts of the institute are directed precisely towards the design and implementation of
technology transfer programs. In fact, IMTA is in charge of running the four larger
technology transfer programs currently existing in the SHN. These are (Talavera,
Jan., 1989) the: a) Program for the Regional Development of the Humid Tropic
(PRODERITH); b) the National Program for the Efficient Use of Hydro-agricultural
Infrastructure (PRONEFIH); c) the National Program for the Efficient Use of Water in
Cities and Industries (PRONEFA); and d) the National Program for the Reuse of
Wastewater (PRONAR).
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* Numerical modeling of hydraulic phenomena in areas such as: groundwater
* Numerical modeling of hydraulic phenomena in areas such as: groundwater
hydrology, hydrology, open channel flow, dispersion of pollutants, etc.
* Analysis and simulation of meteorological phenomena (e.g. droughts, storms, etc.)
* Development of schemes for the optimum operation of water resources systems
(e.g. for irrigation, water supply, power generation, etc.)
* Development and adaptation of technologies for the efficient use of water at the
urban and rural sectors (e.g. lavatory appurtenances)
* Reuse of wastewater for agricultural purposes
* Wastewater treatment
* Pollution control (e.g. biological filters)
* Water quality control
As for the technologies being transferred, these fall mainly into the following fields: a)
planning; b) operations management; c) efficient use of water; d) wastewater reuse; and
e) infrastructure and systems safety; and basically include know-how (through training
programs) and a wide variety of products and processes (Talavera, Nov., 1988).
IV.5.3 Consulting
Consulting activities in the water resources sector have long been considered extremely
important. This is so because many of the problems of the sector are frequently very
specific in nature and usually require rapid solutions. For this reason, in 1947, the SRH
established the "Technical Consulting Group" (CT). The group (integrated into IMTA
since 1986) has long provided support to institutions in the SHN in aspects related to the
design of projects as well as in the construction, operation and maintenance of hydraulic
infrastructure in the country (Talavera, Nov., 1988). Now that the CT is part of IMTA,
its activities have expanded to include consulting in areas related to the adaptation and
transfer of technology to achieve a more efficient use and management of hydraulic
infrastructure.
IV.5.4 Human Resources Development
The growing demands for water services and the increasing complexity of most of the
problems faced by the SHN is emphasizing more than ever the need for having qualified
personnel in the sector. Unfortunately, there are still many deficiencies in the country
regarding the availability of human resources as well as in the quality of the education
and training that they are receiving (especially in the case of technicians and specialists
holding graduate degrees). In addition, there are high turnover rates in many of the
organizations of the sector because of the low wages normally paid as well as because of
the lack of incentives and adequate promotion systems. In order to solve these problems,
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IMTA has been working intensively in the education and training of personnel for the
sector.
IMTA's activities regarding human resources development are organized around the
following programs: training, graduate education, scientific and technological
cooperation, information systems and publications.
In the area of training, the institute constantly runs several programs. For example, in
1992, seven courses were offered to more than 5700 people in areas such as maintenance
and operation of wastewater treatment plants, efficient use of electric power,
management, etc. (IMTA, 1992).
With respect to higher education as of 1992 the institute had granted 162 scholarships (80
foreign and 82 national) in areas such as hydraulics, environmental engineering,
management, etc. (IMTA, 1992). In addition, several students are being prepared by
IMTA's researchers at the Morelos Campus of the Division of Graduate Studies of the
National Autonomous University of Mexico, located within IMTA's facilities.
Currently, this division is offering four degrees: Irrigation and Drainage, Water
Resources Planning and Management, Hydraulics and Potable Water; and Sanitation and
Pollution. In 1992, thirty two students were enrolled in these programs (IMTA, 1992).
As for technical cooperation, in 1992, IMTA participated in 48 agreements with national
institutions (85% with higher education institutions and 15% with other organizations in
the sector (IMTA, 1992)). In the international arena, it established agreements with 17
institutions from 9 countries (US, Spain, France, Japan, Egypt, Israel, Canada, UK and
Germany). In addition, in that year negotiations started to establish cooperation programs
with organizations in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic,
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Panama and Venezuela, as well as with international organizations such as the World
Health Organization and the Pan-American Health Organization (IMTA, 1992). Besides,
the institute actively participates in technical visits, national and international seminars,
conferences and symposia. As a result of this participation, organization from several
countries have expressed their desire to establish cooperation programs with the institute.
IV.5.5 Communication and Diffusion of Actions
The most important contribution of the institute in this area is definitely related to its
participation in the handling of information relevant to the SHN. Since its creation,
IMTA has been working extensively in this field, generating information networks and
establishing services for the handling of information to make it available throughout the
country. After the foundation of the Center for Water Consulting (CENCA), IMTA
consolidated itself as the main receptor, administrator and diffuser of information in the
country (IMTA, 1992). In particular, its participation in this area has been extremely
important to integrate upcoming information for the CNA and SARH (e.g. data collected
from gauging stations scattered throughout the country).
In terms of publications, the institute publishes a journal specialized in hydraulics,
brochures of upcoming national and international events relevant for the water resources
sector and a catalogue of periodicals received by the institute. In addition, IMTA also
publishes each year several manuals and technical documents derived from the work of
its researchers (IMTA, 1992).
IV.6 Resources
Eight years after its official foundation, IMTA has consolidated itself as an important
motor for the technological development of the SHN. Undoubtedly, this fact can be
attributed to a great extent to the quality of its human and material resources base as well
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as to its relatively stable financial position; all of which have provided IMTA with the
capabilities necessary to carry out its missions.
IV.6.1 Human Resources
Since its foundation, IMTA has always enjoyed an good reputation among the
institutions and organizations conforming the Mexican SHN. In fact, the prestige of the
institution is even starting to cross national borders to gain the recognition of important
organizations in other countries. There is no doubt that this reputation is largely the
result of the qualifications and excellence of the human resources of the institute; in
particular, of a good part of its research staff. Through the years, the institute has
managed to recruit some of the best expertise in the Mexican water resources sectors
from universities, government agencies and private organizations. Many of these
researchers are professionals with solid academic backgrounds, vast experience and a
deep knowledge not only of their own technical fields but also of the entire problematic
of the SHN.
Back in 1992, IMTA had 449 employees distributed in the following way (IMTA, 1992):
30 managers, 269 specialists in hydraulics and related fields of expertise, 84 technicians
and 66 management assistants. From the 269 specialists, 115 held graduate degrees
(4 with specialization, 88 with masters and 23 with Ph.D.'s) and 27 are members of the
National Researchers System (SNI).
In order to continuously enhance the qualifications of its personnel, the institute has
established permanent training programs to keep them prepared and up-to-date in areas
such as information systems, project management and communications. Besides, IMTA
has been actively supporting candidates for graduate education and continuous education
programs. As mentioned before, this is being done either through the provision of
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scholarships to study in Mexico or in other countries or through the direct education of
students at UNAM's Division of Graduate Studies located within IMTA's facilities.
IV.6.2 Financial Resources
Since its creation and until 1989, the operational budget of IMTA came entirely from the
federal government in the form of a direct subsidy. However, starting in that year, and
coinciding with the creation of the CNA, IMTA began to obtain part of its financial
resources through contracts with other institutions. In 1989, 14% of its operational
budget came from contracts with the CNA while in 1990 this percentage grew to 36.5%
and one year later to 55%. Therefore, by 1992, from the institute's budget of $34
million, $18.7 million came from the CNA and $15.3 million came from the federal
government (IMTA, 1992).
As can be seen in Figure IV.6.2.1, which shows the evolution of the operational budget
of the institute since its foundation, the total financial resources provided to the institute
during its first five years of operation remained relatively constant in this period.
However, starting in 1991 these resources significantly increased as a result of the
contracting of projects with the CNA. Even though, the difficult economic situation of
the country and in particular of the SHN, is starting to reverse this tendency. This is not
to say that the contracting of projects with the CNA is becoming less important but rather
that the overall amount of funds received by the institute is getting smaller (obtained both
from contracts with the CNA and from direct federal subsidies).
IV.6.3 Material Resources
IMTA is regarded as having some of the finest facilities in the country (and in Latin
America) to perform research in the water resources sector. Eight years after its creation,
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most of the original plans for the construction and equipment of laboratories are now
completed. Some of the main research facilities currently operating at the institute
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include a water quality control laboratory (LCA), the IMTALAB, and a series of
external models to simulate the operation of important water resources projects. The
water quality control laboratory is now fully equipped to allow the determination of the
physical, chemical, biological and microbiological parameters of water and is now being
extensively used in studies related with wastewater treatment, wastewater reuse, and
diagnosis of water quality, among others (IMTA, 1992). As for the IMTALAB, this
research facility is mainly employed to perform studies regarding the efficient use of
water, metering and certification of equipment (e.g. valves, lavatory appurtenances,
gauges, etc.).
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With regard to information systems, IMTA has completed the integration of a single
computer network throughout the institute and has proceeded to the modernization of a
large part of its computer equipment. Also, IMTA has now access to important computer
resources from other institutions such as UNAM and is currently integrated into the
telecommunication network of the CNA (IMTA, 1992). Additional information systems
resources include a wide variety of specialized software packages as well as a large
library that receives, among others, more than 250 periodic journals related to the water
resources sector (IMTA, 1992).
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Chapter Five: Policy Analysis of Alternatives to Link
the Mexican Institute of Water
Technology with the Industrial Sector
V.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze from a policy perspective IMTA's decision to
pursue a development strategy that explicitly stresses the need for the institute to
collaborate more actively with the productive sector. Therefore, the analysis will be
helpful to understand why is the institute trying to implement programs to strengthen its
ties with industry; to look at the possible options that the institute might have and their
implications and finally, to identify the resources needed to implement the policy.
The policy analysis presented here is based on the analytic framework developed by
Grindle and Thomas (1991) to explain policy choice (see Figure V.1.1).71 The reasoning
behind this decision is that the conceptual base of their analytic framework seem to be
adequate to explain how public policy-making is done in countries like Mexico: first,
because policy choices are mainly the result of activities that take place largely within the
state; second, because those choices are significantly shaped by policy elites who bring
into policy-making their own perceptions, commitments and resources to bear on the
content of reform initiatives; and third, because the decisions of policy elites are
influenced by the perceived or actual power of societal groups and interests that have a
stake in reform outcomes (Grindle & Thomas, 1991).
71 Grindle, M., & Thomas, J., (1991), "Public Choices and Policy Change, The Political Economy of
Reform in Developing Countries", John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.
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Figure V.1.1 Framework for Policy Analysis
Source: Adapted from Grindle & Thomas, (1991), op. cit.
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INDIVIDUAL
CHARACTERISTICS
OF POLICY ELITES
V.2 Environmental Context
The first step required to analyze IMTA's decision to pursue a strategy that stresses the
need for a more active cooperation of the institute with the productive sector is
necessarily to understand the reasoning behind this decision. In order to do so, it is
crucial to analyze first of all, the environmental context surrounding such decision. As
seen in Figure V. 1.1, this environment depends both in the context for policy choice and
in the individual characteristics of the institute's policy elites.
V.2.1 Context for Policy Choice
Undoubtedly, the mere fact that IMTA is directly or indirectly part of the National
System for Science and Technology (SINCYT), makes the institute, in one way or
another susceptible of being affected by the structural conditions of this system.
Therefore, it is important to recognize that the economic, political, social and technical
conditions discussed in Chapter Three, will also influence any attempt of the institute to
implement programs to strengthen its ties with the industrial sector. As these conditions
were extensively explained in the analysis of the phenomena of RDO's - Industry
interaction in Mexico, they will not be included again in this chapter. Rather, this section
will present those conditions and policies that have a more direct impact on the SHN and
on the activities of the institute.
V.2.1.1 Economic Conditions
As previously mentioned, the mere fact that IMTA is an institution immersed in the
SINCYT makes it subject to the structural conditions of the system. In particular, the
reduction in public expenditure in science and technology matters has had a profound
impact on IMTA. This is not to say that budget cuts have been such that the institute has
been forced to cancel important projects, shrink research programs or layoff personnel.
But even though this is not the case, there seems to be a widespread opinion at the
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institute that small budget cuts and even stagnant budgets are unacceptable (especially
among top level officials). If the institute is to be able to deal with the increasingly
challenging problems and with the growing demands of the SHN, its financial resources
will also need to be constantly growing.
The reduction in public expenditure has affected the institute through two channels. First,
in the form of direct cuts from the federal subsidies provided to the institute. And
second, through the reduction of operational budgets granted to SARH and the CNA (as
both represent the main "customers" of the institute).
It is important to note that even though the establishment of contract agreements with
SARH and the CNA has reduced IMTA's dependence on direct subsidies from the
federal government, this conditions has really not made the institute financially less
vulnerable. As mentioned in Chapter Four, contract agreements with the CNA provided
55% of IMTA's budget in 1992 while direct subsidies from the federal government
provided for the other 45% (IMTA, 1992). As can be seen, IMTA's dependence on both
the CNA and the federal government is still too large.
In order to have access to financial resources to: a) compensate for budget cuts; b)
generate additional income to expand its activities; and c) reduce IMTA's financial
dependence and vulnerability, the institute has been trying to diversify its funding
sources. This means that IMTA wants to start capturing part of its income from
organizations other that SARH and the CNA. As industry is often regarded as an
important source of funds, it is understandable to consider it a potential customer for
IMTA; especially, because it is perceived that the institute can offer products, processes
and services of great value to the industrial sector.
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V.2.1.2 Societal Pressure
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Mexican SHN is currently facing the challenge
of dealing simultaneously with many complex problems: growing demand for services,
increasing pollution of water resources, water scarcity, stricter demands for water of a
better quality, etc. These problems are complicated even more by the fact that their
solution often has to deal not only with technical difficulties but also with a series of
political, social and even legal conflicts. As a result, institutions working in the SHN are
finding it increasingly difficult to satisfy the needs of the population, particularly because
the solution of these complicated problems often requires large investments and financial
resources are limited. In addition, quite often there is limited time to solve these
problems and therefore, solutions usually need to be found rather quickly.
On the other hand, due to the vital importance of water, it is probably one of the sectors
in which the population often exercises more pressure over authorities to satisfy their
demands. Most of the times, this pressure comes from groups of individuals organized
to demand solutions to their problems (e.g. peasants), but even in the case when societal
groups fail to organize themselves, they seem to be able to exercise some kind of pressure
over the government. This last statement seems to be especially applicable when the
demands come from influential sectors (e.g. industry) and powerful elites that can
exercise considerable pressure over the government to solve their problems.
The coupling of the problems faced by the SHN and societal pressures is forcing
institutions in the SHN to find more appropriate ways to deal simultaneously with these
challenges. For an institute like IMTA, a more active interaction with the productive
sector can certainly push the institute in the right direction as it can serve to improve the
responsiveness of the institute to the demands of an important group of the SHN. If
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IMTA is better suited to identify the true needs of the sector it will certainly be in a better
position to develop technologies of a broader and deeper impact on society.
V.2.1.3 Administrative Capacity
This area probably represents the one in which the institute is less prepared to deal
efficiently with the challenge of interacting with industry. There are no specific
organizational structures set in place for the management of technology; there are still no
organizational units explicitly designed to handle the possible interaction with industry;
the efforts for improving the interaction with organizations other than SARH and the
CNA are scattered across the different coordinations of the institute; there seems to be a
lack of communication and exchange of ideas between the parties involved in these
efforts; and there is a lack of internal regulations and procedures needed to handle the
interaction. In summary, there is a need to institutionalize IMTA's efforts regarding the
interaction.
In addition, although the institute has considerable expertise in a variety of managerial
and technical fields, they require personnel trained in areas such as management of
technology. Also, they need to recruit professionals with some knowledge of certain
legal aspects related for example, with intellectual property protection, formulation of
contracts, etc. Until now, most of the efforts related with technology management have
been directly undertaken by the different coordinations of the institute. However, their
productivity could increase through the guidance and advice of professionals better
trained in these fields.
All of the issues previously described can be extremely important not only for the design
of specific interaction programs but also because they can affect the ability of the institute
to successfully implement and sustain such programs.
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V.2.1.4 The New National Water Law, 1992
In December 1st, 1992, the Official Diary of the Federation published the new National
Water Law (LAN).72 Among its most important provisions, the New Law consolidated
the CNA as the sole executive authority in water-related issues in the country. In
addition, the LAN established the creation of a Public Register for Water Rights
(REPDA) to exercise a better control over water resources and its uses. But most
importantly, the new Law now permits the direct participation of the private sector in the
construction and operation of hydraulic infrastructure. For a country like Mexico this is a
relevant decision because before the enactment of the LAN, all the hydraulic
infrastructure of the country was owned and operated exclusively by the state.
Undoubtedly, the privatization of hydraulic infrastructure in the SHN has the potential of
opening important windows for cooperation of an institution like IMTA with the private
sector. The lack of experience of many of the firms that will enter in the sector can
certainly mean a demand for the technologies, expertise and technical assistance that
IMTA can offer. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that in the near future demands for
the products and services offered by the institute will tend to increase.
V.2.2 Characteristics of Policy Elites
Besides the contextual factors previously described, there is another set of factors that
can be extremely important to understand why is the institute trying to improve its links
with the productive sector. But rather than dealing with IMTA as an institution, these
factors deal with individuals, with the policy elites and the actual decision-makers
responsible for the formulation of policies at the institute. In the specific case of IMTA,
these policy elites are mainly formed by a group of top level officials from the institute
72 Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n, (December 1st, 1992), "Ley de Aguas Nacionales", DOF, Mexico
City, Mexico, pp. 22-44
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itself such as its president, executive provost and several advisors. Although it is
obviously very difficult to generalize upon this issue, it seems that the policy elites of the
institute have some of the following characteristics.
V.2.2.1 Personal Propensities and Goals
It is important to consider the personal propensities and goals of policy elites in policy
analysis because they can help to predict the aggressiveness with which solutions may be
sought and how much change may be considered appropriate (Grindle & Thomas, 1991).
In a bureaucratic institution like IMTA it is frequent to observe how policy-makers tend
to approach problems from a rather conservative position. It is rare to observe drastic
organizational changes or significant shifts in policy. Moreover, even in the cases where
changes like these are necessary, it seems that there is not much propensity among
IMTA's policy-makers to seek for consensus because: a) changes are normally
implemented through rather long time frames and this tends to reduce resistance; and b)
the considerable concentration of power fosters a tendency to impose decisions.
In the case of IMTA the decision to diversify its funding sources came from top level
officials within the SHN and from the institute itself. As it will be explained later on, this
characteristic may be an instrumental factor to enhance the chances for success of the
policy.
V.2.2.2 Ideological Predispositions
A significant part of the personnel working at the institute and in particular its policy
elites believe that IMTA should play a more active role in the solution of the technical
problems embedded in the SHN. This means that according to them the institute should
have a greater participation in the satisfaction of societal needs related with water
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resources. This could explain their apparent desire to expand the presence, relevance and
prestige of the institute not only within the SHN but also within other sectors.
Also, it seems that the institute is emphasizing the role that technology should play in the
development of the SHN. This situation might be a reflex of the generalized belief in
many developing countries that technology is the sole solution of many of their problems.
In the case of the SHN it seems to be taken for granted that technology and modernization
are the correct means to achieve a more efficient and rational use of water.
Finally, there is also a predisposition to think that the appropriate solution to the problems
of the SHN requires an active participation of all the socioeconomic sectors of country.
This means that the search for appropriate solutions requires inputs and active
cooperation from government, industry, workers, peasants and society at large. For this
reasons, organizations in the sector place a great importance to the participation and
contribution of society to the solution of the SHN's problems.
V.2.2.3 Professional Expertise and Training
Since IMTA is an institution deeply involved with R&D and consulting activities, a
significant part of its personnel has a technical background. Not only its researchers but
many of its managers hold engineering degrees, which indicates a strong commitment to
technology. Moreover, many obtained their degrees in countries in which industry
frequently plays a very important role in the creation, diffusion and commercialization of
products and processes derived from scientific and technological knowledge. All of
these factors seem to set the appropriate field for the development of predispositions such
as the ones previously mentioned: technical solutions to problems are frequently
stressed, the role of technology in the development of the sector is emphasized and
sometimes there is a tendency to try to import solutions to national problems from other
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countries unfortunately quite often without taking care of making the necessary
adjustments).
V.2.2.4 Previous Experiences
Although the experience of the institute regarding the solution of problems similar to this
one is rather limited, it seems that one thing is clear. There are many deficiencies in the
way the institute is operating and therefore there is still much room for improvement. In
addition, it is important to note that there are several organizations in Mexico somewhat
similar to LMTA, that have succeeded to diversify their funding sources and to establish a
more active cooperation with industry. Undoubtedly, IMTA's policy elites are aware of
these cases and might try to look at them to learn from their experiences.
V.2.2.5 Position and Power Resources
IMTA is currently giving a high priority to the issue of diversification of funding sources.
As mentioned before, the top level political support for the policy reform can be
extremely important because of several reasons: first, it can ease the acceptance of
reform by the institute's personnel; second, it can provide a high hierarchy to the reform
in the eyes of other organizations (particularly SARH and CNA); and third, it might
increase the chances for success of the reform because it guarantees to a certain extent the
resources and support that are needed.
V.2.2.6 Political and Institutional Commitments and Loyalties
The institute and its personnel can both be characterized as being firmly committed to the
fulfillment of the missions for which the institute was created. They seem to be loyal to
the institute, to the CNA and SARH as well. This is especially true in the case of top
level managers and some senior researchers as they normally keep personal loyalties to
many other top level officials from organizations such as these. Institutions like IMTA
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are still very paternalistic and therefore patronage relationships always tend to prevail in
them (although because of the technical extraction of most of its employees this is not as
clear as in other public organizations). After all, it has to be remembered that IMTA's
president, the executive provost and most of its top and middle-level managers are
appointed directly by other top level officials.
On the other hand, the juridical status of the institute has created a relation of
dependence of the institute with the CNA and SARH that is not only making IMTA
financially vulnerable but that is also limiting IMTA's capacity to perform its
responsibilities efficiently. For example, the close relation of the institute with the CNA
sometimes gives rise to excessive bureaucratic procedures that reduce the efficiency with
which the institute performs its missions (higher costs, time delays, etc.).
This situation is creating a conflict between the desire to make IMTA a more independent
organization and the compromises held by some top level managers with high-ranking
officials of the CNA and SARH that are opposing the reform. After all, it is
understandable that the CNA does not want to loose its influence over IMTA as the
institute is practically the only technical branch of both CNA and SARH.
V.3 Agenda Setting Circumstances
After identifying the context surrounding policy-making and the characteristics of policy
elites, the basic stage is set to understand the initiatives for reform. Now, it is necessary
to analyze the circumstances that brought the problem into IMTA's agenda.
V.3.1 Politics-as-Usual Circumstances
According to Grindle and Thomas (1991), policy reform is influenced by circumstances
that drive particular issues into policy agendas. That is, if policy changes are "crisis-
103
ridden" or if they are the product of what they term "politics-as-usual" circumstances.
Contrary to what seems at first glance, the institute's decision to look for alternative
sources of income corresponds to a "politics-as-usual" type of situation, even though the
country was immersed in an economic crisis when this issue first came into IMTA's
agenda.
The reasoning behind this assertion is as follows: First, the institute really never had to
confront significant budget cuts due to the reduction of federal subsidies and moreover,
starting in 1990, even these cuts were compensated by the income generated from
projects contracted with the CNA.
Second, although the federal government pressured the institute to start capturing income
from organizations other than the CNA and SARH, this pressure still came from inside
the government and not from external actors as in many crisis-ridden reforms. This is not
meant to imply that pressures were not important but rather than IMTA's managers must
have had certain latitude to decide whether or not to push for policy reform and
institutional change.
Third, the stakes at stand in IMTA's policy reform are clearly embedded in the
bureaucratic arena and, in particular, within the institute's bureaucracy. The changes in
organizational arrangements. shifts in power relationships, modification of procedures
and the establishment of new programs with institutions other than the CNA might create
internal conflicts and resistance to change, especially among researchers. Although
obviously all of them are important factors to consider, they are not comparable with
issues such as political stability, often encountered in crisis-ridden reforms. Clientilistic
and paternalistic relationships may be at stake, but the institution as such is not.
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Fourth, in contrast with crisis-ridden reforms, policy-making and the development of
strategies to deal with the problem faced by IMTA was done by middle-level officials.
However, it has to be remembered that the initial directive for reform came from top
management and, moreover, that because of the extreme hierarchization of the institute,
the approval from top officials is always indispensable.
Fifth, under non-crisis conditions such as the ones described here, there is frequently
enough latitude to implement changes incrementally. This situation has some advantages
and disadvantages. On the one hand, it allows for the reduction of opposition to reform
because changes are gradual and this allows people to adapt more easily to changes and
also because it allows for policy adjustments to be made along the way therefore
improving the effectiveness of the policy. However, on the other hand, this condition is
often the cause of significant delays in the implementation of policy reform because when
more important issues arise it forces the reform to be temporarily left aside (as has
happened with IMTA because after several years the institute has not been able to
implement the policy; the institute still seems to be working in building up their own
capabilities for the reform).
And finally, the fact that this policy reform is non crisis-ridden has given IMTA
flexibility in the timing to push for its implementation. Therefore, the institute has
pushed for reform when conditions are appropriate (for example, after the enactment of
the New National Water Law) and leave it aside when they are not (e.g. when CNA is
pressuring to stop its implementation).
V.3.2 Decision-Makers Concerns
Besides the analysis of those conditions that influence policy contents, it is necessary to
analyze how the decisions to implement or reject such policy are made. In order to do so,
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it is important to understand what are the specific concerns of policy elites and more
importantly, of decision-makers.
Due to the nature of both the institute and the policy reform under consideration it is
logical to expect policy-makers to be mainly concerned in this case with two issues: the
"technical correctness" of the proposed reform and the bureaucratic implications of its
implementation.
As mentioned before, organizations like IMTA in which science and technology play
such an important role usually develop a mentality in which the technical aspects of
problems and their solutions are often stressed. As a result, it is not uncommon to
observe how policy-makers try to judge the implications of a particular policy merely
based on their technical content. The reasoning behind this behavior might be that the
"technical correctness" of a particular policy is used to justify decisions, especially when
the policies tend to be unpopular (Grindle & Thomas, 1991). However, and despite its
obvious limitations, this issue of "technical correctness" is still a powerful tool. For
example, in the case of IMTA, the institute can argue that its proposal for greater
independence is congruent with current public policy trends favoring economic
liberalization, open market economies and public austerity pursued by the federal
government.
On the other hand, the implementation of the policies proposed by IMTA imply changes
in the bureaucratic structure of the institute. For this reason, it might be valid to think
that decision-making is dominated by bureaucratic concerns. Under these circumstances,
issues like administrative capacity, budgets, compliance and responsiveness are of great
importance. Factors such as rivalries, competencies and organizational morale may also
bear the minds of the decision-makers. After all, it has to be taken into account that it is
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most likely that many employees will present some opposition to change. People usually
feel comfortable working in environments that provide them a sense of certainty and
stability; but change almost by definition always implies uncertainty and lack of
stability, at least temporarily.73 The way in which change affect power relationships,
career options, labor conditions, etc., may influence the response of bureaucracy to policy
reform and therefore policy elites quite probably bear these factors in mind while making
decisions. So too, are issues related to the establishment of incentives intended to
modify bureaucratic behavior and procedures as well as other considerations like, for
example, the status, position and power of the institute within the government.
While "technical correctness" and bureaucratic implications may be the most obvious
concerns of policy makers at the institute, there is a third factor that is very important.
That is, the ability of IMTA's top management to earn support for the reform from other
top levels officials in the government and from other organizations. Particularly
important may be the support of SARH's secretary or from other Secretaries at Ministries
such as Finance, who might back up the policy if it can be justified, for example, in terms
of economic efficiency.
V.4 Policy Characteristics and Policy Implementation
While the whole processes of policy and decision-making are normally characterized as
being fairly complex, quite often the implementation stage is even more complex.
Despite its importance, however, there is a tendency among many policy-makers to
ignore or to give inadequate attention to the issue of implementation while formulating a
policy (Grindle & Thomas, 1991). Perhaps they chose to do so because of the
complexity involved, or perhaps they just fail to consider it a component of policy-
73 Nadler, A. D., (1988), "Concepts for the Management of Organizational Change", in Readings in the
Management of Innovation, M. Tushman & W. Moore (Editors), Harper Business, New York, New
York, U.S., pp. 718-731
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making; but whatever might be the case, they just seem to take for granted that once a
policy is formulated and the decision to go ahead is made, that such policy will be
implemented as planned. Unfortunately, this belief often proves to be wrong. Sometimes
is even more important to look beyond a certain decision to question whether the
proposed policy has a reasonable chance for being implemented (Grindle & Thomas,
1991). For these reasons, policy-makers need to explicitly take into account this issue
during the policy analysis and to design specific strategies for the implementation stage
of the policy. In order to do so, first it is necessary to analyze the problems associated
with the implementation stage. This implies looking at the potential arenas of conflict,
stakes and available or required resources for the implementation.
V.4.1 Arenas of Conflict
The specific characteristics and contents of policies are largely responsible for
determining the type of conflicts and opposition that surround their implementation
(Grindle & Thomas, 1991). As mentioned before, in this case IMTA might expect to
encounter mainly internal opposition for the reform from the institute's bureaucracy.
However, the final outcome of the policy reform might as well depend on how other
agencies or public officials outside the organization, react to this reform. But even if this
is the case, it is important to note that the concerns for the reform still remain embedded
within the government and not within the general public.
V.4.2 Stakes
Because the arenas of conflict reside mainly within the government, the economic and
political benefits and costs derived from the implementation of the policy will also be
borne by the state, at least in the short term. Although in the long term the public might
benefit from IMTA's improved operating efficiency, initially the costs will be borne by
the officials and institutions affected by the reform. Top level officials might see their
108
clientilistic and patronage relationships altered; coordinations used to handle certain
problems may be affected by the shift in functions to other units; institutions might see
their visibility, prestige, power or position within the government changed, etc.
From all this, it can be observed that the political stakes are relatively low. Therefore, the
real issue is to determine if IMTA has enough capacity to implement the reform and
whether the institute can generate enough support to make the bureaucracy comply with
the reform.
V.4.3 Resources
The previous subsections were useful to determine the potential reactions to the proposed
policy as well as the prospects for sustaining the reform. It is now necessary to assess
whether IMTA has the resources required to implement the policy or if these resources
need to be augmented. The most important resources that the institute will require fall
into the following groups: political, financial, managerial and technical.
V.4.3.1 Political Resources
As mentioned before, the feasibility of a successful implementation of the reform will
depend largely on the capacity of IMTA's top level official to earn the political support of
other agencies and powerful actors. This is particularly important because it has to be
remembered that there are certain interests in the CNA that might oppose the reform.
After all, IMTA is the technical branch of the CNA and for this reason, the Commission
might not be willing to let IMTA become too independent from them. In a sense, they
need to maintain the institute captive to make sure that its lines of research, projects, etc.,
are congruent with their own needs and/or strategy. As mentioned before, the support
from SARH's Secretary as well as from other ministries might be a fundamental backup
to overcome resistance from the SHN.
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Similarly, this level of political support can also be helpful to overcome internal
resistance. Top level support provides a certain degree of hierarchy or relevance to the
policy. For a bureaucratic organization like IMTA, this issue can be a very influential
factor to insure compliance.
V.43.2 Financial Resources
Due to the nature of the policy under consideration, financial resources do not seem to
represent a problem in this case. Most of the changes implied by the reform will consist
mainly of organizational rearrangements. Most likely, it will be possible to deal with this
changes with the operational resources of IMTA (with the probable exception of certain
personnel and professional expertise that the institute might need to recruit).
V.4.3.3 Managerial Resources
Although a good part of the changes proposed can be performed by existing personnel
and expertise it may be necessary to contract some people; especially some managers
with experience in technology management. The new organizational arrangements that
will be needed may not only imply new managers but quite probably new management
styles and mentalities as well. This is an important issue to consider because it will
influence even more the power relationships already affected by the organizational
changes.
V.4.3.4 Technical Resources
The availability of technical resources is closely linked to the skills and expertise of the
institute. As IMTA already has considerable expertise in technical fields related with
water resources, again its main concerns should be the contracting of personnel with
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experience in technology management as well as with some legal expertise in areas such
as technology licensing.
V.5 Policy Content
The content of the specific policy that the institute chooses to implement will depend on
the interaction of the three set of factors described in the previous sections. The broad
orientations and perceptions of policy elites, the contextual factors that help shape those
orientations, and the circumstances surrounding reform initiatives, all interact to
determine this content. Similarly, the specific concerns of policy-makers coupled with
an assessment of the resources available and those that would be required to implement
the policy would also have a deep impact in the policy content.
In the case of IMTA, it seems that at the end, everything came together and pointed out in
the same direction. More external contracting and larger involvement of IMTA with the
productive sector. Figure V.5.1 summarizes the policy analysis for the institute.
111
1. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT
CHARACTERISTICS OF POLICY ELITES
Personal Propensities and Goals
* conservative position towards change
* not much search for internal consensus
* tendency to impose decisions
Ideological Predispositions
* more active role of IMTA in the SHN
* technology seen as the "solution" to SHN's problems
* seek active participation from all sectors
Professional Expertise and Training
· large number of employees with technical background
· tendency to stress technical solutions
· tendency to "import" solutions from other countries
Previous Experiences
* recognition of current defficiencies
* belief that there is still much room for improvement
* knowledge of other institutions successfully
implementing similar programs
Position and Power Resources
* internal support from top level officials
* high status for the reform
Political and Institutional Committments and Loyalties
* strong paternalistic and patronage relationships
CONTEXT FOR POLICY CHOICE
Economic
* Reduction of FES&T
* Financial vulnerability and dependability
Societal Pressure
* Increasing difficulties to satisfy societal
needs
* Strong societal pressure
Adminsitrative Capacity
* Lack of adequate administrative capacity
to handle the interaction (organizational
structures, regulations, personnel, etc.)
* Need to institutionalize interaction efforts
National Water Law
* Privatization of hydraulic infrastructure
* Consolidation of the CNA as the sole
authority in water-related issues in the
country
* increasing demand for IMTA's products
and services
1 2. AGENDA SETTING CIRCUMSTANCES 2
"POLITICS AS USUAL REFORMS"
* no drastic federal budget cuts and contracts with the CNA have compensated for any of these cuts
* pressure for reform comes from within government (this provides policy-makers with certain latitude)
* main resistance for reform can be expected to come from the institute's bureaucracy
* the strategy for reform may be developed by middle level officials
* reform may be implemented incrementally
* there is considerable flexibility in timing for pushing for the reform
DECISION MAKERS CONCERNS
* technical "correctness" of reform (e.g. economic efficiency)
* bureaucratic implications (e.g. compliance, opposition, resistance to change)
* feasibility of earning the support of top level officials outside IMTA (e.g. from SARH)
| 3. POLICY CHARACTERISTICS
I ARENAS - bureaucracy (inside or outside IMTA but within the government)
· costs and benefits borne by the state (short and middle terms)
STAKES * internal bureaucracy largely affected at all levels
· relatively low political stakes
RESOURCES
* Political - mainly from top level officials from other organizations in the sector
* Financial - no major resources needed
* Managerial - need to strengthen and reinforce management base
* Technical - primary need related to managerial expertise
Figure V.5.1 Application of Policy Framework to Analyze the Case of IMTA
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Chapter Six: Strategy for Linking the Mexican
Institute of Water Technology with the
Productive Sector
VI.1 Introduction
Throughout the preceding chapters, this work has gone from a general overview of the
process of RDO's - Industry interaction to a policy analysis of the causes that are leading
a particular RDO to establish programs to interact with the industrial sector. The insights
gained from the presentation made in Chapters Two and Three allowed for a good
understanding of the problems associated with the interaction as well as for a better
comprehension of the structural, procedural and individual factors that may influence the
interaction in the particular case of Mexico. Chapter Four made a presentation of the
Mexican Institute of Water Technology, to allow for an understanding of its mission,
organizational structure, activities, programs, regulations, procedures, personnel and
culture. Chapter Five included a policy analysis to explain why is the institute interested
in the implementation of programs to link IMTA with the productive sector as well as to
explain the role that these programs will play within a more general development strategy
of the institute. It is now the purpose of this chapter to bring everything together and
develop a linkage strategy for the institute. Therefore, the strategy will necessarily have
to take into account: the specific objectives pursued by the interaction; the general
problems endemic to the establishment of cooperation programs as well as those derived
from the particular situation of IMTA; the capabilities of the institute and the demands
from industry; and finally, the resources that IMTA has to obtain to successfully
implement the policy.
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VI.2 Definition of Objectives
One can never seem to sufficiently stress the importance of clearly defining the objectives
pursued prior to the design and implementation of any program or policy reform. For the
particular case under consideration several objectives were identified to justify the
decision to implement programs to link IMTA with the industrial sector. However, it is
important to point out that their relative importance may vary and therefore, it is difficult
to affirm which one wins over the other. This is particularly true because while some of
the objectives are explicitly stated, others seem to be implicitly considered by IMTA's
policy-makers (although this does not necessarily mean that they are less important).
Table VI.2.1 shows the main objectives identified.
Table VI.2.1 Main Objectives for Implementing Programs to Link IMTA with
the Industrial Sector
As can be concluded from the presentation made in Chapter Two, there are obviously
many other advantages or benefits that can be cited to justify the policy reform.
However, the ones included in the preceding table are the ones that most likely were in
the mind of the institute's policy-makers when they decided to seek a more active
collaboration with industry.
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* To generate additional income for the institute and its personnel (especially for
researchers), so that they can function as incentives to improve their creativity,
willingness to innovate and productivity
* To reduce the financial vulnerability of the institute through the diversification of
funding sources
* To reduce the dependence of the institute on the CNA as a means to improve the
efficiency with which the institute performs its missions
* To identify and respond more efficiently to the needs of an important component of
the SHN (the productive sector), ultimately in the benefit of the whole sector and
society at large
On the other hand, it is necessary to clarify expectations or misconceptions that may
develop around the desire to implement programs to link IMTA with industry.
First, most likely, income generated from industry and other sources different from the
CNA and the federal government, will not be enough to entirely substitute for the
financial resources provided to IMTA by these sources. As analyzed in Chapter Three,
the prospects for RDO's - Industry interaction in a country like Mexico are small and
perhaps for the SHN are even smaller. Therefore, it is necessary to take into account that
the chances for IMTA's cooperation with industry may be extremely limited, especially in
the early stages of the program. For these reasons, the funds captured from the
interaction should be mainly viewed as additional resources to expand the participation of
IMTA in the solution of the SHN's problems.
Second, the CNA and SARH still are and most likely will continue to be the principal
public organizations within the SHN. For this reason, IMTA should recognize that the
main needs, problems and opportunities of the sector will be identified and attended
precisely by these organizations and that therefore, the main financial resources of the
sector will continue to be channeled through them (including those "earmarked" to
support scientific and technological development efforts). Therefore, IMTA should not
and is not interested in breaking its ties with these organizations. Its mere intention is to
loosen its administrative ties with the CNA because sometimes they represent
bureaucratic barriers to the efficient performance of IMTA's responsibilities.
VI3 Identification of Potential Areas for Linkage
Through the analysis of IMTA's fields of expertise and the industrial sector needs
concerning water resources sector it is possible to identify those areas in which a common
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interest for the interaction is likely to develop. The principal areas that were identified
for the case under study are presented in Table VI.3.1.
Table VI.3.1 Potential Areas of Linkage of IMTA
with the Productive Sector
It is important to point out that the information contained in this table is treated here as
fields of expertise and not as services that IMTA may offer and industry demand.
However, in the following section, some of these products and services are treated as
mechanisms for the interaction between IMTA and industry.
VI.4 Operational Mechanisms for the Interaction
In order to define the main mechanisms for the interaction of IMTA with the industrial
sector it is necessary to look beyond the potential areas of linkage and to analyze in more
detail the true capabilities of the institute. As these capabilities are the result of the
integration of the human, material and financial resources of the institute, their
assessment allowed for the identification of the principal capabilities that the institute has
developed throughout the years. In turn, this led to the identification of the following
mechanisms for interaction as the ones that may have the largest potential for success.
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* water quality control
* wastewater treatment
* efficient use of water
* certification of materials and equipment
* numerical and computational modeling
* information services
VI.4.1 Contract Research
One of the mechanisms through which the institute has a large potential for interacting
with industry is through the establishment of contract research agreements. The institute
has proved that it has good capabilities for working in the development of products and
processes that industry can use and/or commercialize. This could be the case of
technological developments such as: a) technologies for the efficient use of water (e.g.
valves, wrenches, sprinklers, plumbing fixtures, etc.); b) meter gauges and electronic
comptrollers for the measurement and control of water flow; c) processes and products
for wastewater treatment tailor made for the particular needs of different industries; d)
technologies for the verification and control of water quality; and e) software for the
management of water in manufacturing processes.
VI.4.2 Consulting
As shown by the description presented in Chapter Four, the institute has considerable
expertise in most of the technical areas related with water resources including
considerable experience in the specific problems of the Mexican SHN. For these reasons,
IMTA should consider this expertise as part of its core competencies and therefore it is
important to develop adequate means to exploit them efficiently. Undoubtedly the
offering of consulting services can be one of such means. After all, consulting is not only
one of the most "natural" forms of interaction of RDO's with industry but the institute has
also the advantage of having considerable experience in this area, in contrast with some
of the other mechanisms for interaction that will be presented here. This is particularly
true in the case of the Technical Consulting Group (CT), which has been operating since
1948 and that has accumulated considerable expertise in most of the areas related with
hydraulics and other civil engineering fields. For this reason, the group enjoys a
considerable prestige not only within the SHN but also in other sectors as well. Besides,
as mentioned before, it is expected that demands for services of this sort by firms entering
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into the SHN will tend to increase in the following years as a result of the privatization of
the sector.
VI.4.3 Training Programs
Taking advantage of the considerable expertise of the institute, of its research personnel
and of the facilities of UNAM'S Division of Graduate Studies (DEPFI) located at IMTA,
it is possible to develop a link with industry through the offering of training programs.
These programs, should be explicitly designed to meet the specific training requirement
of industry personnel and could be established in areas such as operation and
management of wastewater treatment facilities, monitoring, testing and control of water
quality, etc.
VI.4.5 Laboratory Services
One of the mechanisms for interaction that is probably easier to implement is the one
related with the provision of specialized laboratory services to industry. This could be
the case for example of the execution of physical, chemical and microbiological analyses
of water quality. This is an area in which the institute has a good potential for
commercialization of its services because many firms and industries cannot afford to
invest in the sophisticated technologies and facilities necessary to perform these analyses
and that IMTA already has available (e.g. laboratory for water quality control).
VI.4.6 Certification of Materials and Equipment
Following a rationale similar to the case of laboratory services, IMTA has a good
potential for the commercialization of services related with the certification of materials
and equipment. Thanks to IMTA's expertise in the technical standardization and
certification of materials and equipment according to Mexican norms for quality control
and to its well equipped testing facilities, the institute has already started testing and
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certifying products for private firms. Some of the industries that have contracted these
services include manufacturers of pipes, valves, joints, meter-gauges and pumps.
VI.4.7 Information Services
Taking advantage of its facilities, information sources and communication networks with
important national and international organizations of the water resources and other
sectors, IMTA can offer specialized information-related services to industry. The
interaction with industry in this area can be done through the provision of services such
as access to data banks, bibliographical searches, direct access to libraries, on-line
consulting, etc.
As the experience of the institute with respect to the interaction with industry is
extremely incipient at this point, it might not be convenient to promote simultaneously
the interaction through all the mechanisms previously described. Rather, it is preferable
to start with those mechanisms that are most simple (e.g. consulting, laboratory services,
certification of equipment, etc.), and later on to seek a deeper interaction through more
complex mechanisms (e.g. contract research). The reasoning behind this suggestion is
that through the provision of the former, it is easier not only to initiate the cooperation
but also to earn the confidence and trust of industrial customers. In turn, if this is
achieved, it may be possible to gradually attract the attention of these customers to some
of the other activities of the institute (e.g. R&D) and hopefully, to motivate in them a
desire to collaborate with IMTA through other mechanisms.
VI.5 Organizational Arrangements for the Interaction
Having identified the potential areas of linkage and the most appropriate mechanisms for
the interaction, it is necessary to design a specific organizational structure to promote,
guide, support and manage the interaction. As mentioned before, until now most of
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IMTA's activities related with technology development have been handled more or less
independently by the different technical coordinations of the institute. Each of them has
been making efforts to establish their own contract agreements and to capture income
from new sources (for example, through the commercialization of products and services).
However, if the institute is to take the effort to promote a more active interaction with
industry more seriously, it needs to institutionalize these efforts. In order to do so, it is
first necessary to establish the appropriate formal organization arrangements to handle the
interaction.
Considering that the possibilities for the successful interaction of IMTA with industry (as
well as with other organizations in the private and public sectors) are rather limited at this
point, it might be advisable to start by establishing a small office or unit in charge of
handling issues related with the management of technology at the institute. This office,
from here on termed as Technology Management Unit (TMU) could play a role
somewhat similar to that played by industrial liaison programs and technology licensing
offices such as those described in Chapter Two. Table VI.5.1 summarizes the main
activities that this unit might undertake.
Organizationally, the TMU could initially form part of the coordination of professional
development, as this is currently the coordination of IMTA more directly related with
other organizations in the SHN as well as with the scientific and technological
development of the sector. However, as the activities of the unit start to become more
relevant for the institute (e.g. as the number of contracts with industry increase), it would
be convenient to place it at a higher hierarchical level to stress the importance of the
interaction with other organizations, and in particular, TMU's contribution to technology
transfer. Whichever might be the case, it is important to give the unit organizational
visibility not only within the institute's industrial customers or partners but also internally
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so that other coordinations of IMTA recognize its work and feel attracted to seek
collaboration with the unit.
Table VI.5.1 Principal Activities/Roles that Could Be Undertaken by IMTA's
Technology Management Unit.
It is important to point out that it may not be convenient to establish this TMU under the
premise that it will be the sole office through which all the activities related with issues
such as technology transfer or contracting should be channeled. Rather, TMU needs to be
envisioned as an office intended to provide support and counseling to the institute's
coordinations in the negotiation and establishment of their own contracts with industry.
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· Provide a visible door through which industry can easily gain access to the
institute's expertise
· Promotion of the products and services that IMTA can offer to the industrial sector
* Offering of help to the different coordinations of the institute and its researchers to
locate industrial sponsors or potential partners interested in the commercialization
of the products and/or processes developed at the institute
* Handling of issues related with the protection of intellectual property from the
products, processes and technical documents developed at the institute. This would
include issues such as the review of patent disclosures, filing of patent applications,
negotiation of copyrights and patent licensing, etc.
* Provision of support and legal advice in the formulation and negotiation of contract
research agreements and other types of contracts involving the provision of
specialized services such as consulting, laboratory testing, certification of
equipment, etc. Similarly, the office could provide support in agreements and
contracts involving the transfer of technology from the institute to industry.
* Formulation of institutional policies and regulations to support and handle the
interaction with industry. These might include, among others, intellectual property
and contract research polices; internal regulations for the generation and distribution
of income; and incentive programs for researchers (such as monetary rewards,
awards and promotions).
VI.6 Formulation of Norms and Policies to Support the Interaction
Although the central objective of the establishment of the TMU is to integrate the
institute's efforts related with technology management, in order to do so, first it is
necessary to formulate clear policies and norms to handle the interaction of the institute
with the industrial sector. These policies and regulations are intended to provide a set of
guidelines for the management of the interaction as well as to define the basic mentality
of the institute regarding this issue.
Although in principle it is logical to assume that all the agreements and contracts
negotiated by the different coordinations of the institute will need to comply with these
policies and regulations, this does not necessarily mean that they have to be too rigid.
On the contrary, the policies should be formulated in such a way as to provide for the
flexibility necessary to negotiate each contract on an individual basis in order to take into
account peculiarities that may be important in each case.
In the following sections suggestions are made of the most important factors that should
be considered for the establishment of each of the main policies and regulations required.
VI.6.1 Intellectual Property and Publication of Results Policies
As mentioned in Chapter Two one of the main barriers for the establishment of fruitful
mechanisms for the interaction between RDO's and industry is related to a number of
controversies associated with the protection of intellectual property. Typical examples
of this sort are disputes over: a) ownership of intellectual property rights (particularly in
the case of patents); b) terms and conditions for technology licensing; and
c) publication and confidentiality of results.
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Without entering into much detail in the specifics of the policies that the institute needs to
formulate to handle intellectual property protection, Table VI.6. 1.1 presents a general
guideline of recommendations that IMTA may consider. These recommendations
basically define the posture that IMTA can adopt towards intellectual property during the
negotiation of contracts such as those involving contract research or technology transfer.
Therefore, the TMU can have these recommendation in mind while formulating the
respective policies.
Table VI.6.1.1 General Recommendations for the Formulation of Intellectual Property
Policies to Handle the Interaction of IMTA with the Industrial Sector.
VI.6.2 Contracting Policies
If the institute is to be able to start signing contracts with industry it is first necessary to
clearly define policies to regulate those agreements as well as the main principles that
should guide such policies. The following are some of the most important provisions to
consider. First, it is necessary to define what types of projects and what characteristics
should those projects have in order for the institute to accept to carry them out. Some of
the factors that may be considered in this case include, intellectual content, relevance for
the development of the SHN, congruence with IMTA's missions, etc. It is important to
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· Maintain property rights of all patents
· Maintain the rights for disclosure of research results
· Deny sponsors' requests for modification of research results
· Establish a copyright policy for software development
· Minimize the use of information of restricted access
· Try to avoid the signature of confidentiality agreements as long as this does not
constitute a barrier for the interaction
· Formulate several alternatives for technology licensing (including, license
exclusiveness, royalty payments, etc.)
point out here that in this case it is fundamental to distinguish between those contracts
involving research agreements and those related to the provision of services such as
consulting, laboratory testing, certification of equipment, etc. The reason is that their
intellectual content, relevance, etc. obviously varies according to their specific nature.
Second, specific regulations are needed for the provision of specialized services such as:
the time allowed for each researcher to participate in consulting activities; the terms and
conditions for using laboratory facilities and equipment (to avoid conflicts regarding
priorities in their use); the possibility of entrepreneurs who are also researchers to
contract the institute's services, etc.
Third, it is essential to define who should be responsible for the research, performance of
tests, etc. (in terms of individuals, teams, coordinations, etc.). This is very important not
only for the internal control of the project but also to clearly define formal
communication channels with the sponsor.
Fourth, it is important to make clear who has the authority for the technical direction of
the project. This is mainly intended to avoid potential conflicts over which organization
(IMTA or its industrial partner) has authority for taking decisions involving the technical
content of the project.
Fifth, due to the nature of some of the projects performed (particularly research
agreements), it is necessary to clearly define what are the responsibilities of IMTA. This
is especially important if the results of the project are uncertain. In these cases, it might
be convenient for the institute to adopt the position that research will be performed on a
best effort basis.
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Sixth, for the same reason stated before (considerable uncertainty in some research
projects), it is necessary to define the institute's responsibility in terms of delivery of
results within a certain time frame. In this sense, it might be convenient to provide for
some latitude in terms of compliance with deadlines.
Seventh, it is important to define the terms and conditions for the reimbursement of costs
as well as the attitude that the institute is willing to assume with respect to financial risks.
This could include, for example: a) responsibility for financial losses; b)the integration
of total costs (e.g. percentage to be charged for indirect costs, such as use of libraries,
maintenance of physical facilities, etc.); c) terms and conditions for the reimbursement of
costs (e.g. time for repayment); d) discretion for shifting funds between different
categories within the same project; e) procedures for approval of costs in excess of
authorized budgets; f) presentation of expenditure reports to project sponsors, etc.
And finally, it is essential to define the terms and conditions for the termination of the
contract. These include the establishment of circumstances for termination, payment of
phase-out costs, rights for termination, notification responsibilities, etc.
In order to take into account these issues, it may be advisable for IMTA to formulate
standard agreements to regulate its interaction with industry. This is not to say that all the
contracts signed at the institute should comply with these standard agreements, but rather
they are intended to provide a basis for the negotiation of contracts. Therefore, they
should be formulated in such a way as to be flexible enough to provide enough latitude to
accommodate the specific requirements of IMTA and/or sponsor for each particular
project.
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VI.6.3 Income Generation and its Distribution
As the financial resources of IMTA have always come either from the federal
government or from the CNA, the institute has never developed clear regulations to
handle the generation of income and its distribution. However, IMTA's intention to
diversify its funding sources is stressing the need to define clear regulations regarding the
management of these funds. Although the establishment of these regulations is not
necessarily of the competence of the TMU, it is important to express through this unit the
provisions that should be considered in those regulations to facilitate the interaction with
industry.
Right now, this issue of income generation and its distribution represents one of the most
important barriers that the institute is encountering to capture funds from sources other
than the CNA. Overcoming this barrier is currently one of the most important challenges
that the institute is facing because this is by no means an easy task. The reason is that the
judicial status of the institute (as part of the CNA) does not allow IMTA to capture
income from sources other than the federal government or the CNA. From a legal
perspective IMTA does not have an independent judicial status and therefore, it is only
recognized as part of the CNA. In practice this means that even if the institute is able to
negotiate contracts with industry, the payments received from the commercialization of
its products and services have to be made to the Treasury of the Federation (of the
Ministry of Finance) and not to the institute. Even though later on the Treasury can
reimburse these payments to SARH or the CNA there is no way to guarantee that the
income generated will ever get back to the institute.
The most obvious way to handle this situation would be to try to obtain the legal status of
an independent organization. However, this strategy will definitely encounter
considerable opposition from SARH and CNA, which most likely will not be willing to
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loose their control over the institute. For this reason IMTA is now considering the
alternative of creating an independent foundation, that could capture those resources and
later on grant them to the institute in the form of contributions or donations. Although
the establishment of this foundation seems to be a feasible alternative to solve the
problem, it is important to note that in order to successfully create the foundation it is still
necessary to earn the support of top level officials. In particular, the political support of
SARH's Secretary will be once more fundamental for implementing the reform.
On the other hand, the clear definition, implementation and diffusion of policies and
regulations for the generation and allocation of funds across IMTA's entire organization
is important because of several reasons. First it is vital that researchers be aware of the
benefits that the interaction with industry can bring to them. If researchers fail to
recognize the importance of these benefits or if the institute fails to communicate those
benefits to them, the incentives will not work as desired and the overall productivity of
IMTA may not be sufficiently enhanced. And second, it is also extremely important that
there is certainty among the different coordinations and research groups of the institute of
the benefits that the same interaction will bring to each unit. This is important because
there may be some groups more actively engaged in the interaction and its members may
feel that it is unfair, for example, if resources generated by them are allocated to other
research groups.
Some of the main points that these regulations need to include should be: a) distribution
of income generated by a particular interaction within IMTA and its different
coordinations (e.g. the percentages granted to IMTA, to the particular coordination
managing the project, to the specific unit in charge of developing such project and
finally, to the researchers or other personnel involved in it); b) the discretion granted to
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coordinations and research groups for the use of the new funds; c) the amounts and
timing for the allocation of funds, etc.
VI.6.4 Evaluation Programs, Incentives, Rewards and Promotions
The first step required to establish successful incentive and promotional programs in an
institution like IMTA is necessarily to design adequate systems to evaluate the
performance of coordinations, teams and individuals participating in any project
involving some kind of interaction with industry. It is frequent to observe how many
RDO's base their evaluation schemes in systems such as those involving "peer review" or
the number of articles that researchers publish in technical journals per year (and, in
particular, in terms of those published in magazines of international distribution).
However, this approach may not be appropriate for the evaluation of researchers working
in technological developments derived from contracts with industry (Waissbluth, 1990).
The reason is that quite often this technological developments are too specific and of little
interest to leading journals. Therefore, other factors need to be incorporated into the
evaluation schemes. This could be the case, for example, of patent applications and
patents obtained. However, it is important to consider this issue carefully because a
patent does not guarantee the successful commercialization of an invention nor the
quality of the work performed. Perhaps a more adequate alternative would be to try to
evaluate the performance of researchers based on the relevance, creativity and quality of
their work. The problem is that in order to do this it is necessary to rely again on the
"peer review" process; but anyway, the mere fact of explicitly considering this issue in
the evaluation is much better than considering only the number of publications.
An evaluation system makes it possible to design incentives to: a) earn support and build
in participation (especially from researchers) for the establishment of programs to interact
with industry; and b) enhance the creativity, willingness to innovate and productivity of
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the institute's personnel. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the mere interaction with
industry can motivate researchers in several ways. First, because it represents a chance
for enhancing their own knowledge and to keep them abreast of technological progress;
second, because it gives them a chance to contribute to the real satisfaction of society's
needs and to break down the negative opinion that industry has of RDO's researchers;
third, because it allows them to increase their professional prestige; and finally, because it
represents a chance to increase their personal income.
Although all these motivations might be powerful reasons for researchers to support and
actively participate in RDO's - Industry interaction programs, it is still necessary to
design specific incentives to motivate this cooperation even more. Especially important
in the case of countries like Mexico and institutions like IMTA are the monetary
incentives given to researchers. The reason for this situation is that their wages are
relatively low (particularly as compared with researchers working at developed
countries). To solve in part this situation, IMTA currently grants several bonuses to its
researchers throughout the year. However, in reality these bonuses constitute part of
their base salary and therefore, they do not represent any additional income for them.
Some researchers have found a way to compensate for this condition through their
admission into the National Researchers System (SNI) as this admission means they are
eligible for receiving an additional payment from the federal government. However, the
admission to the SNI is not easy (only 27 of the 269 researchers from the institute form
part of the system) and therefore, many of the institute's employees are still underpaid.
As mentioned before IMTA's decision to pursue a strategy that stresses the need for a
more active collaboration with the industrial sector was largely the result of solving
precisely this condition. However, even if the institute succeeds in the establishment of
interaction programs, there are still some problems that must be solved regarding the
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provision of monetary incentives to researchers. For example, in contrast with what
happens in other countries (e.g. the U.S.), in Mexico, the Federal Working Law (LFT)
forbids public employees to receive work compensations in addition to their own wages
(as wages are considered to compensate entirely for their work). In practice this means
that IMTA's researchers are not eligible for receiving a share of the royalties captured by
the institute even if they were derived from the licensing of an innovation developed by
them. Similarly, researchers cannot obtain earnings derived from the commercialization
of software, articles or books performed by the researchers during their normal working
hours at the institute. According to the LFT, all of these innovations, books, etc., and the
income derived from their commercialization belongs entirely to IMTA and therefore the
institute does not have any responsibility to share earnings derived from them with its
researchers.
In order to handle this situation, the institute is considering once more the possibility of
creating an independent foundation. As mentioned before, the foundation may attract
funds from industry and later on transfer those funds to the institute as donations.
Because of their nature, the foundation would be able to "earmark" these donations and
assign them to particular researchers in the form of awards, prizes, etc.
With respect to promotional systems the most important aspect to have in mind is that it
is necessary to clearly define how these systems work. This can significantly help to
reduce the expectations and uncertainties that frequently surround RDO's working
environments. In this way, individuals can make their own estimates of their real
chances for their promotion and react accordingly (hopefully motivated by their
aspirations to occupy higher posts). However, it is important to point out that in a
bureaucratic organization like IMTA, in which many researchers and/or managers are
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directly appointed by top level officials, this uncertainty really will never be completely
eliminated.
VI.7 Staffing the Programs for the Interaction
There seems to be a generalized agreement among researchers studying the phenomena of
RDO's - Industry interaction that some of the most critical success factors for the
establishment of programs to link the two types of organizations are related to the
performance and attitudes of the individuals involved in the interaction (Solleiro, 1990).
Therefore, IMTA should place special attention in the selection of the personnel from
each coordination, team, etc., that will interact with industry and also from those that will
work at the TMU.
Much has been written about the importance of functional roles (e.g. gatekeeper, idea
generators, project sponsors, champions, etc.) to enhance the overall performance of
RDO's.74 However, at the initial stages of the interaction program, the selection of
technology managers (TM's) to staff the TMU is particularly relevant. The reason for this
assertion is that these individuals normally are the vital links between the RDO's and
industry because they often work as translators among the different parts involved in the
interaction.7 5 In a way, their job is intended to reduce the ideological, social and cultural
differences that naturally exist among individuals working at each of these sectors in
order to facilitate communications among them. The role of TM's may be especially
critical if the individuals involved in the interaction have different professional
backgrounds (e.g. managers vs. engineers) as this condition normally complicates
communications even more. For these reasons it is convenient that these individuals are
74 Roberts, E. & Fusfeld, A., (1982), "Critical Functions: Needed Roles in the Innovation Process", in
Career Issues in Human Resources Management, R. Katz (Editor), Harper Business, New York, New
York, U.S., pp. 182-207
75 Diaz, R., (1992), "Recursos para el Desarrollo Tecnol6gico. El Caso de la Comunidad Emergente de
Gestores de Tecnologia", in Polftica Cientifica e Innovaci6n Tecnol6gica en M6xico, Campos y
Medina (editors), IIMASS-UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico, pp. 117-139
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characterized for being proactive leaders, effective communicators and also for having
skills in a variety of fields of expertise (engineering, management, economics, etc.) so
that they are well prepared to understand, assimilate, translate and communicate
information among the parties involved in the interaction.
VI.8 Formal and Informal Communication Networks
The importance of communication networks for a successful interaction between RDO's
and industry has been continuously stressed throughout this work. Broadly speaking,
these networks can be characterized as consisting of two types of communication
channels: formal and informal. Most of the processing and exchange of information
relevant to the interaction precisely takes places through these channels.
Formal communication channels are the direct result of organizational structures.
Therefore, the specific organizational arrangements set in place by the institute to manage
the interaction, as well as the existing power relationships and lines of authority will
determine the general configuration of the formal information network.
In contrast, informal communication channels tend to develop more or less
spontaneously, with no managerial intervention.7 6 However, the relevance of informal
communications for the interaction process and, in general, for the efficient flow of
information stresses the need for management to set an appropriate stage for their
development. This could be the case of the organization of seminars, conferences,
workshops, etc. with the participation of personnel from the institute and industry in order
to set up a convenient stage for people to get acquainted with each other.
76 Allen, TJ., (October, 1970), op. cit.
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Because the interaction itself requires a great deal of information flow, the direct personal
contact within and between RDO's and industry is a valuable communication channel.
After all, verbal communication permits timely information exchange, rapid feedback and
critical evaluation, as well as the opportunity for real-time recording and synthesis of
information.7 7 Similarly, verbal communication reduces the possibilities of
misunderstandings, misinterpretations and confusion as it makes the flow of information
more effective.
On the other hand, the establishment of specific communication networks should be
contingent on the nature of the task, on the nature of the task environment and on the
degree of interdependence of the task with others (Tushman, 1979). This means that the
patterns of communication should be different according to all these aspects. Therefore,
the communication channels established by IMTA to promote the interaction through
mechanisms such as the provision of technical services (e.g. laboratory testing or
certification of equipment) should be different from those related for example, with
consulting or contract research. In practice what this means is that it is not always
convenient to promote the direct interaction between all the individuals involved in the
interaction. When the interaction consists of mechanisms such as contract research, it
may be convenient to promote direct communication between researchers from IMTA
and technical expertise from industry; but when this interaction involves routine services
such as laboratory testing, the interaction can probably be more effective if it is done
through a laboratory supervisor rather than through the person directly performing the
test. The use of individuals such as supervisors (often referred to as "boundary spanning
individuals") is especially important when there are differences in the language and
technical orientation of the individuals participating in the interaction. Therefore, in this
77 Tushman, M.L., (Winter, 1979), "Managing Communication Networks in R&D Laboratories", in Sloan
Management Review, Sloan Management Review Association, Alfred P. Sloan School of
Management, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S., pp. 37-49
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sense, these "boundary spanning individuals" play a role of "translators", similar to that of
the professionals that will need to work at the TMU.
Finally it is important to mention that both networks have to be flexible enough to adapt
to the different information processing demands of the various mechanisms used for the
interaction as well as to the dynamic nature of these mechanisms and their particular
information requirements.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Recommendations
Throughout the previous chapters this work has presented an overview of the problems
associated with the interaction between RDO's and industry placing particular emphasis
on the principal factors motivating or inhibiting the collaboration. The analysis of the
experiences of several institutions and countries was certainly very valuable not only for
pointing out these factors but most importantly for providing useful insights on possible
alternatives to overcome most of the problems related with the interaction.
Certainly, there are many conclusions that can be drawn from this work including
important aspects related to each of the three levels of analysis presented here: structural,
institutional and individual. Similarly, there are many recommendations that can be
made to RDO's, industry and governments so that they can set the basis and take
appropriate steps to foster the development of fruitful relations between RDO's and
industry. However, as the ultimate purpose of this work is to analyze the situation of a
particular RDO and to apply the results of that analysis to design a strategy to link this
organization with the industrial sector, most of the conclusions and recommendations
presented here refer to the specific case of IMTA.
Although it is obvious that this characteristic significantly constraints the applicability of
the observations made here, it is important to note that many of the constraints and
opportunities found in this case may also be encountered by other RDO's and industries
trying to establish somewhat similar programs. Obviously this does not mean that the
experiences of IMTA can be readily extrapolated to these cases. However, they certainly
can provide valuable insights for other institutions facing similar problems.
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On the other hand, it is important to recognize that due to the nature of the institutions
involved in this case, most of the comments presented here are based on considerations
of institutional and individual factors rather than on the structural conditions affecting the
interaction. This should be easy to understand because it has to be remembered that these
conditions are mostly external to RDO's and therefore these organizations have almost
nil influence or control over them.
According to these rationale, the following recommendations can be made:
The objectives of the policies and programs related with the interaction of the institute
with industry have to be clearly defined and communicated: a) externally, to
powerful actors that might have some kind of influence over the institute (e.g. CNA
and SARH); and internally, to IMTA's personnel across the entire organization.
This has to be done before the policies and programs are actually implemented in
order to reduce the possibilities of misunderstandings and misinterpretations; to clear
out confusion; and in particular, to reduce uncertainties which may create among
researchers the perception of an unstable working environment and therefore,
possibly giving rise to opposition to their implementation. Similarly, a clear
definition and communication of goals will prevent the formation of false
expectations and myths around the interaction. This consideration can also be very
important because if these expectations are not satisfied by the results of the
interaction programs, they can be very damaging both for the institute and for its
personnel. Not only can this situation diminish the real value of the interaction in
front of the eyes of people inside and outside the institute but it also has the potential
for affecting the prestige and reputation of researchers and the institute itself.
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* The implementation of actions and programs to link the institute with industry needs
to be done gradually. Initially, simple mechanisms and organizational arrangements
for the interaction may be used. Later on, as experienced is gained and as the work
load increases, more complex mechanisms can be used (e.g. R&D consortia or spin-
offs) and organizational arrangements (e.g. technology transfer centers) can be set in
place. Whichever may be the case it is absolutely essential for IMTA to provide
enough visibility to both programs and organizational arrangements, inside and
outside the institute. This will not only help promote the capabilities of the institute
and therefore the interaction itself, but it will also provide certain hierarchy to the
interaction programs and this is an issue that may be particularly critical to insure
internal compliance.
* The formulation, implementation and wide diffusion of policies and regulations
supporting the interaction is also indispensable. This could be the case of those
related to: intellectual property protection, generation of income, distribution of
earnings, evaluation of personnel, provision of incentives and rewards and those
concerning promotional systems, among others. The relevance of these actions is that
they are essential to: a) raise the awareness of personnel from the institute of the
constraints and opportunities provided by these policies; b) reduce the uncertainties
regarding the costs and benefits that particular researchers, coordinations, etc., can
derive from the interaction therefore allowing them to make more informed decisions;
and c) provide the basic guidelines to handle the interaction with industry as well as
to let the institute's personnel know the main position of IMTA regarding this issue.
* The staffing of the programs designed to link the institute with industry is an issue in
which IMTA's management has to place especial attention. As discussed before, it is
desirable that those individuals directly involved in the interaction fulfill particular
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requirements in terms of their qualifications (e.g. technical expertise, good
communication skills, proactive leadership, etc.). After all, the human factor is a vital
element of the interaction because most of the barriers frequently encountered are
precisely related to differences in the attitudes and perceptions of the individuals
involved in such interaction. In this sense, it is absolutely essential to staff the
programs with professionals: a) capable of handling efficiently the conflicts that
might arise during the interaction; b) with the ability to listen, assimilate, translate and
communicate information of different natures between both parties; and c) firmly
committed to overcome the multiple barriers that will be encountered during the
implementation of the programs.
Because of the nature of the interaction process, the institute will need to take
appropriate steps to insure the development of good communications among the
parties involved in the interaction. This will require on the one hand, the
establishment of formal communication channels to ease the flow of information
inside and outside the organization; and on the other, the provision of proper working
conditions to foster the emergence of personal relationships and informal
communication channels.
It is advisable that when the institute is working in the design of its strategy for
interacting with industry, they do so considering "flexibility" as one of the main
premises of such strategy. As mentioned before, this is absolutely essential to
eliminate unnecessary barriers (such as extensive bureaucratic procedures) and also to
provide enough room to accommodate particular needs from both parties or
otherwise, the interaction may be inhibited.
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* Due to the complexity inherent in the establishment of programs to link RDO's with
industry; the difficult structural conditions that the SHN and Mexico are currently
experiencing; the difficulties associated with the juridical status of the institute and
with its integration into the SHN; the limited demand that may be expected for its
products and services (at least initially); and the lack of experience of the institute in
the interaction with industry, it is important to recognize that the possibilities of the
institute to interact with industry are limited, at least in the short term. For this
reason, IMTA should expect to obtain small benefits from these programs in their
initial face. However, this does not necessarily have to be discouraging because their
implementation costs will also tend to be small.
* It seems that the interaction with industry can be a valuable means for the institute to
generate additional resources, to diversify its funding sources and to reduce to some
degree its financial dependence on the CNA and the federal government. Similarly, it
can be helpful to provide monetary resources to grant incentives to the institute's
researchers in order to motivate their creativity and their desire to innovate.
However, the establishment of these programs should be mainly viewed as a mid or
long-term effort rather than as a short-term commitment. Under these premises, the
establishment of programs to link the institute with the productive sector should be
viewed as intended to set the basis for its sustainable development, but in a way more
congruent with the real demands of the different sectors of the SHN.
139
Bibliography
Allen, T.J., (October, 1970), "Communication Networks in R&D Labs.", in R&D
Management, A.W. Pearson (Editor), Alden & Mowbray Ltd., Oxford, U.K., vol. 1,
no. 1, pp. 14-21
Araoz, A., (1993), "How MIT Interacts with Industry: Some Teachings for Latin
America", Unpublished Paper, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.
Centro para la Innovaci6n Tecnol6gica, (October, 1992), "Rhone Alpes: La Regi6n de
Todas las Industrias", in Integraci6n Tecnol6gic, CIT, Unidad de Difusi6n UNAM,
Mexico City, Mexico, pp. 29-30
Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologfa, (1989), "CONACYT Informa. 1989",
CONACYT, Mexico City, Mexico
Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia, (1992), "FORCCYTEC. Fondo para el
Fortalecimiento de las Capacidades Cientfficas y Tecnol6gicas", Informative Brochure,
CONACYT, Mexico City, Mexico
Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologfa, (1992), "PIEBT. Programa de Incubadoras de
Empresas de Base Tecnol6gica", Informative Brochure, CONACYT, Mexico City,
Mexico
Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia, (1992), "PREAIN. Programa de Enlace
Academia-Industria", Informative Brochure, CONACYT, Mexico City, Mexico
Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia, (1987), "Marco de Aplicaci6n de Estfmulos
Fiscales y Exenci6n de Impuestos Establecidos en Diversos Ordenamientos Leeales
Actualmente en Vigor", CONACYT, Mexico City, Mexico
Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologifa, (1993), "Indicadores de Actividades
Cientificas y Tecnol6gicas", SEP, CONACYT, Mexico City, Mexico
Cyr, R., et al., (1985), "Spending Smarter: Comorate-University Cooperation in Research
and Development", Corporate-Higher Education Forum, Les Editions Marquis Lte,
Montreal, Canada
Davis, B., (October, 1985), "Technology Brokers Meet Limited Success", in High
Technology, Technology Pub. Co., Boston, Massachusetts, U.S., pp. 66
De Maria y Campos, M., (1988), "M6xico Frente a los Retos de la Nueva Revoluci6n
Tecnol6gica", in Comercio Exterior, SECOFI, Mexico City, Mexico, vol. 38, issue 12,
pp. 1084-1094
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n, (August 7, 1986), "Decreto pnor el ue se Reforman
Varios Artfculos del Diverso por el que se Cre6 el Organismo T6cnico Administrativo
Denominado Comisi6n del Plan Nacional HidrAulico", DOF, Mexico City, Mexico,
pp. 29-31
140
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n, (January 16, 1989), "Decreto por el que se Crea la
Comisi6n Nacional del Aeua como Organo Administrativo Desconcentrado de la
Secretarfa de Agricultura y Recursos Hidriulicos", DOF, Mexico City, Mexico, pp. 2-4
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n, (June 7, 1988), "Reglamento Interior del Instituto
Mexicano de Tecnologfa del Agua", DOF, Mexico City, Mexico, pp. 17-20
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n, (December 1st, 1992), "Ley de Aguas Nacionales", DOF,
Mexico City, Mexico, pp. 22-44
Dfaz, R., (1992), "Recursos para el Desarrollo Tecnol6gico. El Caso de la Comunidad
Emergente de Gestores de Tecnologia", in Polftica Cientffca e Innovaci6n Tecnol6gica en
M6xico, Campos y Medina (editors), IIMASS-UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico,
pp. 117-139
Dos Santos, S. & Parejo, M., (1991), "Parques Tecnol6gicos: Un Analfse Comparativa
de Experiencias Consolidadas de Paises Desenvolvidos e Iniciativas de Paises
Latinoamericanos", in Memorias del IV Seminario de Gesti6n Tecnol6gica, Caracas,
Venezuela, pp. 255-265
Escorsa, P., (1991), "Parques Tecnol6gicos: Una Evaluaci6n de las Experiencias Europea
y Norteamericana", Memorias del IV Seminario de Gesti6n Tecnol6gica, Caracas,
Venezuela, pp. 267-274
Gereffi, G., (1991), "International Economics and Domestic Policies", Chapter 9 in
Economy and Society: State of the Art, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, California,
U.S., pp. 231-258
Grindle, M. S. & Thomas, J. W., (1991), "Public Choices and Policy Change - The
Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries", The Johns Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.
Instituto de Investigaciones Electricas, "Technological Developments and Services",
Informative Brochure, IIE, Cuernavaca, Morelos, Mexico
Instituto de Investigaciones Electricas, "Informe Anual 1992", IIE, Cuernavaca, Morelos,
Mexico
Instituto Mexicano de Tecnologia del Agua, (1992), "Informe 1992", IMTA, Jiutepec,
Morelos, Mexico
Instituto Mexicano de Tecnologfa del Agua, (November, 1992), "IMTA:Perspectivas de
Comercializaci6n de Tecnologfas del Agua", Internal Document, IMTA, Jiutepec,
Morelos, Mexico
L6pez, R., et. al., (1992), "Motivations and Obstacles to University Industry Cooperation
(UIC). A Mexican Case", Internal Document, CIT-UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico
L6pez. R. & Solleiro. J.L.. (1992). "Promoci6n de la Innovaci6n a Partir de la
Cooperaci6n entre Centros de I&D y el Sector Productivo", Internal Document, C1T-
UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico, pp. 101-118
141
Mackenzie, I. & Rhys, R. J., (1985), "Universities and Industry - New Opportunities from
Collaboration with Universities and Polytechnics", The Economist Intelligence Unit, The
Economist Publications, Ltd., London, U.K.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, (1993), "The MIT Industrial Liaison Program: A
Guide to Members", MIT-Industrial Liaison Program, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.
Nadler, A. D., (1988), "Concepts for the Management of Organizational Change", in
Readings in the Management of Innovation, M. Tushman & W. Moore (Editors), Harper
Business, New York, New York, U.S., pp. 718-731
National Council for Science and Technology, (1992), "Indicators - Scientific and
Technological Activities. Mexico. 1992", CONACYT, Mexico City, Mexico
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, (1984), "Indust ryand
University - New Forms of Co-operation and Communication", OECD Publications,
Paris, France
Peters, L. S., & Fusfeld, H. I., (1982), "Current U.S. University/Industry Research
Connections", in University Industry Research Relationships, National Science
Foundation, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., U.S.
Preston, J. T., "The Role of the University Licensing Office in Transferring Intellectual
Propertv", Internal Document, MIT-Technology Licensing Office, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, U.S.
Roberts, E. & Fusfeld, A., (1982), "Critical Functions: Needed Roles in the Innovation
Process", in Career issues in Human Resources Management, R. Katz (Editor), Harper
Business, New York, New York, U.S., pp. 182-207
Secretarfa de Programaci6n y Presupuesto - Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia,
(1990), "Programa Nacional de Ciencia y Modernizaci6n Tecnol6gica. 1990-1994", SPP
- CONACYT, Mexico City, Mexico
Secretaria de Recursos Hidriulicos, (1975), "Plan Nacional Hidriulico 1975", SRH,
Mexico City, Mexico
Serrano, F., (1992), "La Propiedad Industrial en Mdxico (Nueva Lev am su Fomento v
Protecci6n)", Editorial Porria, S.A., Mexico City, Mexico
Solleiro, J. L., (1990), "Gesti6n de la Vinculaci6n Universidad-Sector Productivo"., in
Vinculaci6n Universidad-Sector Productivo, BID-SECAB-CINDA, Santiago, Chile, pp.
167-192
Solleiro, J.L., (1990), "La Vinculaci6n de la Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de MCxico
con el Sector Productivo", Working Document, CIT-UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico
SRI International, (1986), "The Higher Education-Economic Development Connection:
Emerging Roles for Public Colleges and Universities in a Changing Economy",
American Association of States and Colleges (Editors), Washington, D.C., U.S.
Talavera, A., (December, 1987), "Marco de Desarrollo Tecnol6gico del Sector HidrAulico
Nacional", Internal Document, IMTA, Jiutepec, Morelos, Mexico
142
Talavera, A., (November, 1988), "Estado Actual de los Principales Elementos del
Proceso de Desarrollo Tecnol6gico del Sector Hidrdulico Nacional", Internal Document,
IMTA, Jiutepec, Morelos, Mexico
Talavera, A., (January, 1989), "Diagn6stico y Consideraciones sobre una Prospectiva
Tecnol6gica del Sector Hidrdulico Nacional (Informe Final)", Internal Document, IMTA,
Jiutepec, Morelos, Mexico
Talavera, A., (1991), "Nuevos Instrumentos de Desarrollo Tecnol6gico en M6xico: Las
Incubadoras de Empresas de Base Tecnol6gica (Contexto y Diagn6stico)", Memorias del
IV Seminario Latinoamericano de Gesti6n Tecnol6gica, Caracas, Venezuela, pp. 337-346
Toledo, J., (November, 1991), "Justificaciones de Polftica Industrial y Comercial para
Abrogar la Ley de Transferencia de Tecnologia", in Comercio Exterior, SECOFI, Mexico
City, Mexico, vol. 41, issue 11, pp. 1036-1040
Tushman, M.L., (Winter, 1979), "Managing Communication Networks in R&D
Laboratories", in Sloan Management Review, Sloan Management Review Association,
Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S., pp. 37-49
Villareal, R., (November, 1991), "La Nueva Ley Mexicana en Materia de Propiedad
Intellectual", in Comercio Exterior, SECOFI, Mexico City, Mexico, vol. 41, issue 11,
pp. 1057-1065
Waissbluth, M., (1990), "Regulaci6n Academica de la Vinculaci6n", in Vinculaci6n
Universidad-Sector Productivo, BID-SECAB-CINDA, Santiago, Chile, pp. 150-163
143
